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The Siren Is Calling: Economic and Ideological
Trends Toward Privatization of Public
Police Forces
KARENA RAHALL*
The landmark Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United has opened
the floodgates to allow unlimited corporate campaign donations, and
Supreme Court doctrine is shifting back to the Lochner-era's focus on
economic rights. At the same time, there are efforts underway across the
United States to privatize public services in order to alleviate what pro-
ponents claim is a shortfall in revenue due to the recession. Within those
privatization efforts, public policing has become a new front, with out-
sourcing and wholesale privatization of the police underway. This Arti-
cle adds to the existing scholarship a political analysis of privatization
efforts, including how lobbying and campaign financing are making
wholesale privatization in the area of policing a very real possibility.
This Article looks at the example of Camden, New Jersey, where
the city's entire police force was fired and replaced with a county-wide
force in order to shed pension and wage obligations, as an incubator for
future wholesale privatization of the police. Considering the trend of
corporate lobbying through groups like the American Legislative
Exchange Council that write model legislation and deliver it to
lawmakers, as well as unlimited campaign donations, this Article traces
the current trend toward police privatization. It argues that without
more transparency and some limitations on such expenditures, the pub-
lic cannot fully and fairly participate in decisions about whether to
relinquish force-protection to private corporations. Understanding the
potential consequences for both public safety and democratic principles
requires systemic, legislative and electoral transparency that currently
remains deficient.
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The first truth is that the liberty of a democracy is not safe if the
people tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it
becomes stronger than their democratic state itself. That, in its
essence, is Fascism-ownership of Government by an individual, by
a group, or by any other controlling private power.'
INTRODUCTION
The current perception of economic distress in cities across the
United States has fueled an increase in calls to privatize public services2
and to expand privatization of the criminal justice arena.' For example,
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Recommendations to the Congress to Curb Monopolies and the
Concentration of Economic Power (Apr. 29, 1938), in 1938 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 305 (Samuel I. Rosenman, ed.).
2. See Kathryn Edwards & Kai Filion, Issue Brief No. 250: Outsourcing Poverty: Federal
Contracting Pushes down Wages and Benefits, EcON. POL'Y INST. (Feb. 11, 2009), available at
http://sl.epi.org/files/page/-/pdf/ib250.pdf; Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive
Employee-Contractor Distinction, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 133 (2012); Jody Freeman & Martha
Minow, Introduction to GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
1 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
3. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits of Criminal
Justice Privatization, 2010 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 265.
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privatization is already ubiquitous in the prison industry.' Although
most people consider their local police force to be a natural extension of
government, many state and local police departments partner with pri-
vate firms in a hybrid of public and private service.' Some municipali-
ties are now taking the next step of outsourcing their public police forces
entirely. This Article focuses on this new stage of police privatization
and examines the intersection of economic distress, political influence,
and the law that has led municipalities to embark on a path toward
wholesale privatization of public police forces.
Rising pension obligations and declining revenue are the primary
justifications given by governments that are rethinking how they provide
public services.6 For example, Camden, New Jersey, fired its entire
police force, only to create a county department with only one city in the
county participating in this new department: Camden.' With minimal
public outcry, the plan allowed the local government to start over, shred-
ding the contract it had negotiated with the police union and hiring new
officers at lower wages without pension obligations. Foley, Minnesota,
represents the other example this Article analyzes: wholesale privatiza-
tion. Having already outsourced to the county sheriff, the local govern-
ment sought to save further by hiring a private security company to take
over policing.' The public became so concerned about the plan that it
was abandoned and the town restored its local public police department.
Other cities have explored hybrid systems of public and private patrols:
for example, Chicago attempted to replace public police with private
security in a large downtown district but scrapped the plan after the local
police union fought and defeated it.9 In New York City, the police
4. See Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Works: The Case of Prisons, in GOVERNMENT
BY CONTRACT, supra note 2 (providing a comprehensive discussion of privatization including of
the private prison industry, a subject this Article acknowledges as pertinent to its analysis, but
beyond its focus).
5. The wave of partial privatization of police forces has generated scholarship on the State
Action Doctrine and the efficacy of partial privatization. See, e.g., Christian Turner, State Action
Problems, 65 FLA. L. REV. 281, 303-08 (2013); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private
Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 115-16 (2004) [hereinafter Job, The Paradox of
Private Policing]; Sean James Beaton, Counterparts in Modern Policing: The Influence of
Corporate Investigators on the Public Police and a Call for the Broadening of the State Action
Doctrine, 26 ToURo L. REV. 593, 598-99 (2010).
6. See Michael A. Pagano et al., City Fiscal Conditions in 2012, NATIONAL LEAGUE OF
CTIES: RESEARCH BRIEF ON AMERICA'S CITIES (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.nlc.org/
Documents/Find%20City%20Solutions/Research%20Innovation/Finance/city-fiscal-conditions-
research-brief-rpt-sepl2.pdf; NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N & NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE BUDGET
OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES, at vii (2012), available at http://www.nga.org/files/
live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/FSS1206.PDF [hereinafter NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N].
7. See infra Part I.C.2.a.
8. See infra Pan I.C.2.b.
9. Mick Dumke, Faced with a Cop Shortage, Some Officials Look to Private Policing,
2014] 635
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
department manages the "Paid Detail Unit," which essentially leases city
police officers to private companies to patrol private property in uni-
form.o In order to illuminate the circumstances under which these plans
have emerged, this Article explores how politics, ideology, and the law
have created an atmosphere in which outsourcing and privatization are
"on the table" and offers an analysis of the nuances that make these
plans seemingly appealing to local governments but ultimately danger-
ous to the public trust.
Without demonizing the very notion of police privatization, this
Article will consider the pros and cons of such plans, but it will also
consider another layer to this debate that has not yet been fully articu-
lated by legal scholars since the Supreme Court changed campaign
finance law with its landmark ruling in Citizens United." There is now
an unprecedented infusion of corporate money that is devoted to politi-
cal candidates and lobbying, with the aim of fueling privatization efforts.
These efforts are buttressed by evolving jurisprudence that is likely to be
strengthened and expanded in the foreseeable future. Taken in conjunc-
tion with the current economic situation that most states and municipali-
ties face, this financial force, with full-throated legal backing, has
opened the door to new opportunities for private interests to influence
public actors in order to gain more access than ever before. The secrecy
that pervades the political process and how money is used to influence
legislative activity makes a fully developed debate about police priva-
tization difficult.
Tracing the evolution of the applicable law and history related to
both policing and economic liberty rights-because both are germane to
a better understanding of how police privatization may advance-this
Article analyzes two existing paths toward that end: 1) outsourcing
police services to larger government entities that can take over the oper-
ations, mitigating wage and benefit obligations; and 2) negotiating con-
tracts with private companies that will take over the duties entirely,
relieving local government of the burdens associated with long-term
benefit and wage obligations. The positions that favor and oppose police
CHICAGo READER (Aug. 25, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/archives/
2011/08/25/faced-with-a-cop-shortage-some-officials-look-to-private-policing.
10. See Joanne Wasserman, Call 'Em NYPD Green: Private Finns Paying Uniformed Cops
for OT Shifts, Daily News, N.Y. CrrY PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT Ass'N (Aug. 10, 2003), http://
www.nycpba.org/archive/nydn/03/nydn-030810-ot.html (noting the program began in 1998 and
was expanded after Sept. 11, 2001); Naomi Wolf, NYPD for Hire: How Uniformed New York
Cops Moonlight for Banks, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2012, 12:57 PM), http://www.guardian.co.
uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/17/nypd-for-hire-cops-moonlighting-banks.
11. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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privatization are then laid out and a fuller context that examines the
political influences at work is considered.
Part I will provide a brief historical context focusing on shifts relat-
ing to policing and to constitutional doctrine. With respect to policing,
Part I will describe the shift from private to public policing, which was
an innovation of the mid-nineteenth century, as well as more recent
shifts back from public to private. This section outlines the history in
order to gain a more fully developed perspective of what a future system
of privatized police might look like.12 Interwoven in this history is the
history of relevant constitutional doctrine, culminating in the current
Supreme Court's shift back to an economic-rights focus comparable to
the reasoning it used during the Lochner era.13 The trajectory of the law,
with campaign finance limitations heavily curtailed and collective bar-
gaining increasingly challenged,14 has left open a space for police out-
sourcing and privatization.
Part II explores the advantages and disadvantages of police priva-
tization. Proponents of privatization suggest that accountability and
monopolization can be addressed through contracting and state regula-
tion. Opponents contend that abrogation of democratic principles and
wage depression are likely consequences of privatization. While impor-
tant to the debate, a full accounting of these advantages and disadvan-
tages is impossible because of the largely hidden means by which
political influences are advancing police privatization efforts, a phenom-
enon that Part III explores.
Part IHl focuses on the political influences that are advancing police
privatization efforts. In particular, Camden, New Jersey, offers insight
into outsourcing police and how such a plan can be seen as an incubator
for future privatization plans. While Camden did not hire a private cor-
poration to take over its police force, it did create an entirely new model
that eliminated its current force with the strong political and financial
backing of one unelected player whose interests benefited greatly from
it. This Part will look at the example that outsourcing in Camden pro-
vides as a forerunner to the possibility of wholesale police privatization.
This Part will also look to the private prison industry for insight into
12. Legal scholars have written extensively on the history of policing and public-private
partnerships. See Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, supra note 5; Elizabeth E. Joh, The
Forgotten Threat: Private Policing and the State, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 357 (2006)
[hereinafter Joh, The Forgotten Threat]; Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police,
2005 UTAH L. REV. 573; David Alan Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, 43 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 89 (2006); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999).
13. See infra Part I.A.2; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
14. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Judge Voids Wisconsin Law Curbing Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2011, at All; Steven Greenhouse, In Michigan, a Setback for Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
9, 2012, at Bl.
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how financing elected officials has opened the door to privatizing crimi-
nal justice services. This Part will analyze how that political financing
translates into business opportunities and consider the consequences for
police forces and the public in impoverished municipalities.
I. HISTORY REPEATS
A. Origins of Public Policing and Economic Liberty Rights
In order to contextualize trends toward police privatization, this
Section provides a historical picture of how policing came to be a public
service. In conjunction with that history, this Part traces the Supreme
Court's interpretation of substantive due process and its focus on eco-
nomic liberty, the effect of which permitted abuses by private forces that
were only reined in after the New Deal. This shifting jurisprudence high-
lights the ways in which force-protection by private actors is closely tied
to legal interpretation and economic power.
1. FROM PRIVATE PATROLS TO PROFESSIONAL POLICE
Should privatization models be adopted, understanding some of the
issues that cities encountered before the police became a public profes-
sional force is essential to predicting the potential pitfalls that lie ahead.
Between the mid-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, law enforcement
was carried out by constables and night watchmen in northern cities like
New York, Boston, and Philadelphia." Men who were unpaid patrolled
the streets, keeping order and serving warrants.16 Constables, who over-
saw the night watchmen, were established by the local government and
answerable to local courts." They patrolled the streets in the day, pro-
tecting the public and private businesses, while watchmen patrolled at
night." Constables were generally tradesmen, expected to take on their
police duties as a civic obligation.1 9 Those who could afford it generally
hired substitutes to handle their duties for them.2 0 Businesses also hired
private guards as additional protection.2 1 The system was only mini-
mally effective at combating crime, and corruption became common-
place.2 2 Typically, constables would employ anyone who was willing to
15. THE ROLE OF POLICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (Bryan Vila &
Cynthia Morris eds., 1999).
16. Id. at 4.
17. ERIC H. MONKKONEN, POLICE IN URBAN AMERICA 1860-1920, at 34, 47 (Robert Fogel &
Stephan Thernstrom eds., 1981).
18. THE ROLE OF POLICE IN AMERICAN SocIETY, supra note 15, at 4.
19. See id.
20. See Sklansky, The Private Police, supra note 12, at 1206.
21. See id. at 1206 n.226.
22. See id. at 1206.
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do the dangerous work of patrolling the street at night, and those night
watchmen often worked hand-in-hand with criminals to earn extra
money in exchange for their quiet cooperation. 23 Further complicating
this disparate organizational structure was the fact that investigating
crime was not a public matter at all; constables would make their extra
money by privately investigating and pursuing alleged criminals for
profit.24 This mechanism of policing operated without coordination
between public and private entities-and the public was generally at the
mercy of both, yet not satisfied with either.25 During the same period,
while the North faced growing populations in its cities, the southern
states employed a different kind of organized policing scheme: slave
patrols. 26 These patrols operated primarily in the rural South and while
regulated by the state, were comprised solely of voluntary, unpaid white
males using their own weapons.27
Starting in the 1840s, several large American cities implemented
the first state-controlled professional police forces.2 8 However, private
investigative services still flourished that blurred the lines between pub-
lic and private police,2 9 particularly because the police wore no uniforms
to set them apart.30 By 1853, New York City had a uniformed public
police force, and by the end of the century, virtually every major city
had a similar professional force.3 1 With constables and night watchmen
no longer available for private businesses to utilize, private security
became a formal option when Allan Pinkerton opened his Protective
Police Patrol in Chicago in 1858.32 His company quickly expanded east
to New York and Philadelphia and primarily serviced banks and private
businesses as guards and investigators.3 3 Pinkerton's National Detective
Agency ("Pinkerton") quickly became the armed force of many private
companies to both spy on employees and brutally suppress union dis-
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See THE ROLE OF POLICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 15, at 13 (noting Benjamin
Franklin's commentary about corruption, which described watchmen as "ragamuffins" who would
work for "a little drink" while constables who paid them kept the remainder of money collected
from taxes meant to be used for proper watchmen wages).
26. Id. at 14-15.
27. See id. at 15-16.
28. See MONKKONEN, supra note 17, at 42-46; THE ROLE OF POLICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY,
supra note 15, at 25-29; Sklansky, The Private Police, supra note 12, at 1207-08.
29. See Sklansky, The Private Police, supra note 12, at 1212.
30. See id. at 1207.
31. Id. at 1208.
32. See THE ROLE OF POLICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 15 at 40; Sklansky, The
Private Police, supra note 12, at 1211-12 (discussing the Pinkerton expansion into the northwest
and eastern United States).
33. See THE ROLE OF POLICE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, supra note 15, at 40.
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sent.3 4 By the late 1800s, Pinkerton and its competitors supplied replace-
ment workers to companies with striking employees, infiltrating unions,
and clashing violently with workers." The public began to consider
whether these private forces should be reined in and force-protection
regulated by the state when Congress began an investigation into their
activities in 1893.36 While Congress implemented no laws governing the
states' use of private police forces, the debate had begun about public
trust and the role of the police in the public sphere.
2. ECONOMIC LIBERTY RIGHTS AND CORPORATE POWER AT THE
TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
While the public began to question the power of private corporate
security, the courts and Congress still failed to recognize the need for
regulatory oversight and continued to draw a bright line between private
and government action. The only legislative result of the congressional
investigation in 1893 was the implementation of a law prohibiting the
federal government from hiring private security to carry out police oper-
ations, known as the "Anti-Pinkerton Act"; the Act did nothing to for-
mally prevent state and local governments from using such companies.39
Congress blamed the states for failing to protect private property rights
adequately and left that duty to the states."0 Certainly, private businesses
continued to employ private security, but the hearings raised public
awareness about the distinct roles of public and private force-protec-
tion.41 Pinkerton and other private agencies continued to offer their ser-
vices to companies to quell labor disputes and spy on labor unions." In
fact, the hearings did nothing to stem the violence associated with labor
34. Sklansky, The Private Police, supra note 12, at 1213-14.
35. Id. at 1214-15 (discussing the Homestead, Pennsylvania, clash between Pinkerton guards
and striking union workers at the Carnegie Steel Mill, which left three workers and twelve guards
dead).
36. Id. at 1215-16 (noting that although Congress passed the Anti-Pinkerton Act, which
prohibited federal employment of Pinkerton detectives, Congress refused to address the broader
concerns of private police action, concluding that the matter was best left to the states to address).
37. Id. ("The most important results of the Homestead investigations, however, were broader
public knowledge of the extent of private policing in late-nineteenth-century America, and deeper
discontent with that phenomenon . . . .").
38. Act of Mar. 3, 1983, ch. 208, 27 Stat. 572, 591 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 3108
(2012)); see Job, The Forgotten Threat, supra note 12, at 367; Sklansky, The Private Police,
supra note 12, at 1215 & n.297.
39. See FRANK MORN, "THE EYE THAT NEVER SLEEPS": A HISTORY OF THE PINKERTON
NATIONAL DETECTIVE AGENCY 26 (1982). Although the congressional hearings did spark a
"flurry" of companion laws in states that had not already tried to limit the use of private police,
"such laws probably had little practical effect on private policing." Id. at 107.
40. See Job, The Forgotten Threat, supra note 12, at 366.
41. See Sklansky, The Private Police, supra note 12, at 1214-16.
42. See id. at 1216.
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disputes and the participation of private security firms-which only
became better armed and more violent-continued into the 1930s.43 In
order to contextualize how these forces operated unhindered in the years
around the turn of the twentieth century, it is important to identify how
the courts viewed labor and economic liberty rights under the law.
Tracing the laws that protected corporate interests and property
rights in that period is an essential part of understanding the jurispruden-
tial shift that this Article argues is taking place now, leading to outsourc-
ing and privatization of force-protection around the country. Scholars
locate the emergence of substantive due process rights primarily in the
Lochner-era Supreme Court cases, which recognized economic liberty
rights, usually at the expense of the working class." Although there
were cases prior to Lochner that used the same theory to protect property
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the term "substantive due pro-
cess" was not yet created.4 5 In 1873, the Slaughterhouse Cases recog-
nized certain fundamental rights-albeit in the dissent-with regard to
the "liberty to contract," including the first rumblings of a substantive
due process right.4 6 Then in 1897, the Court revisited this new reading
of the Fourteenth Amendment and found a substantive right to due pro-
cess granting citizens, including corporate citizens, the "liberty to con-
tract."4 7 Corporate constitutional rights had already been acknowledged
43. See Joh, The Forgotten Threat, supra note 12, at 367-69 (discussing the next
congressional hearing in response to violent labor disputes, citing news articles on the La Follette
Committee).
44. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 117-18 & nn.59-61 (2011) (arguing that Lochner has been
singled out to represent the entire line of economic liberty rights cases (citing LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978))).
45. See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408, 493-94 (2010) (discussing the first interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to include an
understanding that people had "vested rights" in property rights by Justice Thomas McIntyre
Cooley in 1868 (citations omitted)).
46. 83 U.S. 36, 114-18 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting). In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the
plaintiffs were butchers who were required to pay a fee to work in the only slaughterhouses
approved by the state government, which they contended represented a monopoly and abridged
their Fourteenth Amendment rights under the privileges and immunities clause and the equal
protection clause. Id. at 57, 66 (majority opinion). The Supreme Court ruled against the butchers,
finding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause did not apply because
it only protected citizens of the United States and not citizens of a state. Id. at 74.
47. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) ("The 'liberty' mentioned in that
amendment means, not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free
in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation;
and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned."). However, the Court only
found that right with regard to the Amendment's application to the states. Id. at 591. Only later did
the Court tie the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments together, finding
2014]1 641
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in 1886 when the Supreme Court ruled that corporations should be
treated like individual persons for purposes of taxation under the Four-
teenth Amendment,48 and now those corporate citizens were vested with
economic liberty rights.49
Along with cases that defined economic liberty rights in ways that
effectively prioritized employers over their workers, the Supreme Court
also defined "state action" in a way that barred regulation by state
authorities of private activities. In the first case to address "state action"
authority, the Court ruled that the federal government could not impose
restrictions on a private militia that was attacking black voters.so Fol-
lowing that decision, the Court decided the Civil Rights Cases, a consol-
idation of five similar cases." The Court ruled in one decision that the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 was unconstitutional in that it violated the Priv-
ileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it
gave the government the authority to regulate private business activi-
ties.52 Because private companies employed private security forces, they
could not be considered state actors and therefore were not required to
adhere to constitutional protections with respect to their privately funded
and supervised activities." Justice Joseph Bradley carved out a private-
action-versus-state-action definition of the Fourteenth Amendment that
was used to restrict government regulation of a wide range of business
activities.54
Favoring business interests in the realm of force-protection and
labor contracting, the Lochner Court prioritized private enterprise over
government regulation, a doctrine this Article argues is recurring under
the current Supreme Court. While there is some disagreement about
whether the Lochner-era Court embraced what has come to be known as
that substantive due process also applied to federal regulations. In Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161, 173 (1908), the Court had already decided the landmark case of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 53 (1905), but now the era was well underway, finding the right to contract firmly rooted in
both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and limiting the ability of both states and the federal
government to interfere.
48. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
49. See Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589.
50. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (finding that Fourteenth
Amendment did not apply to individuals but only to activities by state actors).
51. See 109 U.S. 3, 4 (1883).
52. Id. at 13.
53. See id. at 11-13.
54. The holding concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment "[d]oes not invest Congress with
power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of state legislation; but to provide
modes of relief against state legislation, or state action, of the kind referred to. It does not
authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to
provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and the action of state officers,
executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the
amendment." Id. at 11. See also infra note 56.
642 [Vol. 68:633
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"laissez-faire constitutionalism,"" the fact remains that the effects of
Lochner and its progeny favored the interests of the powerful and
wealthy over workers who had less bargaining power in the realm of
contracting, especially with respect to employment and labor laws.
During that era, the Court restricted state and federal government
authority to exercise power over private economic relationships, tending
to find parties free to enter into contracts at will and therefore outside
the scope of government intervention." This view of contracting rights
remained essentially unchanged with respect to labor relations and
workers' rights until 1937." The jurisprudence marking this period is
squarely in line with a view of limited governmental authority to protect
workers and expanded individual economic liberty rights; for workers,
even the small gains through legislation and regulation were limited by
the Court through decisions that protected the employer and private
interests.59 In 1936, Congress attempted to act once again through a sub-
55. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 23 (arguing that the bakers in Lochner were backed by
large-scale bakeries that would benefit from a law limiting the amount of hours the bakers could
work because the small bakeries had fewer employees and needed them to work longer); Matthew
J. Lindsay, In Search of "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism", 123 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 55, 55-57
(2010), http://harvardlawreview.org/medialpdf/vo1123 forum lindsay.pdf; David E. Bernstein,
Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 58-60 (2003); David N. Mayer, The Myth of "Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism": Liberty of Contract During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217,
217-19 (2009); Bernard H. Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 SAN DIEro L. REv. 453, 453-54
(1985).
56. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (taking a narrow view of the
Fourteenth Amendment by strictly limiting interference in questions of contracting between
parties, whatever their respective positions or the effects those contracts might have on the larger
economic landscape); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908); Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1923) (striking down a federal minimum wage law for women);
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (striking state law forbidding contracts that banned
union membership).
57. See Lochner, 198 U.S. 45; Adair, 208 U.S. 161; Adkins, 261 U.S. 525; Coppage, 236 U.S.
1.
58. See, e.g., Lindsay, supra note 55, at 55 & n.2 (noting that West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937), is often considered the end of the Lochner era); Mayer, supra note 55, at 217
& n.3. Before this time, the Court viewed the Commerce Clause as a limited power of the federal
government to regulate those activities that had a direct relationship to interstate commerce. The
Court did permit some regulations that appeared to be only tangentially related to commerce, if at
all, but the Court applied a distinctly moralistic standard in those decisions and generally found
regulations of the economic variety off-limits. The Great Depression, a result of the stock market
crash of 1929, found millions of Americans unemployed or working grueling hours for little pay.
Congress attempted to regulate some of the harshest working conditions but the Court saw no
reason to re-imagine its narrow view of the Constitution and continued to strike down legislation
that attempted to level what many saw as an unfair playing field between workers and employers.
President Roosevelt's "court-packing" scheme legendarily caused the jurisprudential about-face.
See infra note 68.
59. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918) (striking down the Keating-
Owen Act of 1916, better known as the Child Labor Act, finding that Congress did not have the
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committee that investigated labor unrest and the role of private security
companies in it.60 The subcommittee released scathing reports on these
companies' union busting activities, including spying from within as
well as violently disrupting union activities. 6 ' The findings were damn-
ing and tarnished the public's view of private security companies but
produced little in the way of regulation.6 2
It is within this landscape that companies gained the upper hand in
matters of contract and defense of property, keeping collective bargain-
ing at bay, as well as using private forces against workers. Private secur-
ity forces had plenty of work in spite of the Anti-Pinkerton Act, as the
law had no authority beyond the federal government.63 Although some
jurisdictions did attempt to limit their number,6 4 private forces operated
without much scrutiny and profited from the gaps left by the public
police force. 65 Even the state police chiefs recognized the necessity for
private security because no public force was capable of handling all
property protection.66 The public and Congress increasingly recognized
the need for some delineation between public and private force-
protection, and with the New Deal, the Court began to acknowledge the
same.67
Substantive due process doctrine began to shift away from its ideo-
logically entrenched focus on economic liberty and embrace a more
nuanced approach that included workers' rights. With the onset of the
New Deal, the Court began to change course on unregulated economic
liberty rights. 8 In West Coast Hotel, Chief Justice Hughes wrote the
power to ban the sale of goods across state lines just because those goods were produced in a
factory that employed children).
60. See MoRN, supra note 39, at 186-87 (discussing the La Follette Committee reports
between 1936-1941); Joh, The Forgotten Threat, supra note 12, at 369.
61. See MoRN, supra note 39, at 186-87.
62. See id. at 188.
63. See Joh, The Forgotten Threat, supra note 12, at 367, 373.
64. Id. at 367 & n.58 (citing cases where judges refused private security licenses on the
grounds that there were too many in the jurisdiction).
65. Id. at 368 (noting that some stores created cooperatives in which members shared security
services as well as the names of "repeat offenders").
66. Id. at 372.
67. Id. at 371 & n.83 (citing District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937), and lower
court cases in which courts noted inherent bias of private security witnesses in criminal cases).
68. Legal scholars are well acquainted with the "shift in time that saved nine." The well-
known proverbial twist refers to the abrupt and halting course reversal of Justice Owen Roberts in
both West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Both cases were decided only months after FDR proposed his "court-
packing" legislation-federal legislation that would permit the President to appoint a new
Supreme Court justice for each sitting justice over the age of seventy-and-a-half. It did not pass.
See S. 1392, 75th Cong. (1937); Jamie L. Carson & Benjamin A. Kleinerman, A Switch in Time
Saves Nine: Institutions, Strategic Actors, and FDR's Court-Packing Plan, 113 PuB. CHOICE 301,
304-05 (2002).
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majority opinion and addressed the Court's departure from prior rulings,
finding that economic conditions had changed for working people since
192369 and surprisingly, that "[tihe Constitution does not speak of free-
dom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of
liberty without due process of law."7 0 This represented a dramatic
change in the Court's reasoning, finally subjecting contracting and labor
rights to some scrutiny and recognizing government power to limit some
of the practices companies used to maintain an upper hand.
3. PosT WORLD WAR II POLICING AND THE
STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
While this Article is not focused on the State Action Doctrine, it is
important to acknowledge its role in the debate about private police and
outsourcing of police services because it is germane to accountability
and the potential pitfalls associated with monopolization. Understanding
the State Action Doctrine frames the debate historically in order to trace
the laws governing force-protection and the public trust, or what people
should expect from their local police force and its relationship to consti-
tutional protections. A municipality must be cognizant of its liabilities
and the citizenry clear about its rights.
After World War II, public police forces evolved and became more
bureaucratic, centralized, and professional. Collective bargaining and
unions gained recognition from the public, politicians, and courts, and
companies were less able to deploy private armies to quash union
organizing.72 Companies like Pinkerton moved out of the public eye and
into the more mundane world of securing private property and con-
ducting private investigations without the focus on infiltration and spy-
ing.73  Although widely used, private security activities were less
69. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 390 (1937).
70. Id. at 391.
71. See Joh, The Forgotten Threat, supra note 12, at 373-74.
72. See id.; Sklansky, The Private Police, supra note 12, at 1218-19. It is important to note
that private sector unions gained collective bargaining power and protection first with the passage
of the Wagner Act in 1935, while public sector unions were not recognized until later. E.g.,
Kenneth Casebeer, Drafting Wagner's Act: Leon Keyserling and the Precommittee Drafts of the
Labor Disputes Act and the National Relations Act, 11 INDUS. RELATIONs L.J. 73, 73-75 (1989);
Archibald Cox & John T. Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REv. 389, 491 (1950). In 1958, New York City mayor Robert
Wagner signed the "little Wagner Act" giving city employees collective bargaining rights.
Anthony C. Russo, Management's View of the New York City Experience, 30 PROCEEDINGS ACAD.
Sci. 81, 82 (1970). Then in 1959, Wisconsin became the first state to legalize public sector
collective bargaining rights. E.g., Morris Slaveny & George R. Fleischli, A Comparison of the
Wisconsin and Federal Labor Relations Acts, 2 CoMPARAHrvE LABOR L. 1, 8 (1977).
73. See Sklanksy, The Private Police, supra note 12, at 1220.
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scrutinized by the public. 7" However, courts began to better define the
role of private security as separate from public police.
The doctrinal separation between private and public force-protec-
tion that was promulgated after World War II remains principally
unchanged and continues to define how private security can be held lia-
ble for constitutional rights violations under certain circumstances.7 6
The State Action Doctrine was applied to a private police force for the
first time in 1946 when, in Marsh v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held
that a town entirely run by a private company was a state actor when it
performed the duties normally performed by a government municipal-
ity.77 The case considered whether a "company town" that functioned
like a municipality, providing public services including security, could
prohibit someone who did not live there from distributing religious liter-
ature." The Court held that because the town was open to the public, the
company could not prohibit constitutionally protected speech within its
borders. Under Marsh, where a public police force has been turned
over to a private entity with government oversight of those duties, that
force would certainly be a state actor. The case illustrates the Supreme
Court's willingness to hold a private company to a public standard if it
provides services the same way a public town would.so After Marsh, the
Court addressed private police in two fairly narrow decisions, conclud-
ing that if they are deputized by a municipality, then they must adhere to
the same constitutional requirements public police follow." Once shop-
ping malls with private security gained in popularity and number, the
Court again faced the task of distinguishing what role private security
must play in respecting constitutional protections. In the 1960s, the
Court found that malls were similar to municipalities because they were
74. See id.
75. See id. at 1229-47.
76. See id. at 1279-80.
77. 326 U.S. 501, 505, 509-10 (1946).
78. Id. at 502.
79. Id. at 509-10.
80. See id. It is worth noting that Marsh did not overturn the Supreme Court's ruling in the
Civil Rights Cases; it simply found that taking on the role of providing public services subjects
private entities to constitutional oversight. Id. In a contemporaneous case, the Supreme Court also
ruled that private homeowner's associations could not enforce racial covenants because to do so
would require courts to uphold them in challenges, making the state complicit in violations of
Fourteenth Amendment protections, so homeowners can only ask for voluntary complicity in such
circumstances. See Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1948).
81. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 98-100 (1951) (finding private guard hired
by lumber company who beat confession out of alleged thief a state actor because deputized
"special" policeman showed suspect a badge and local detective present); Griffin v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 130, 135-37 (1964) (finding that deputized amusement park guard was a state actor who
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing park's segregation rule when he arrested
African-American guests for trespass); Beaton, supra note 5, at 603, 608, 615.
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open to the public-essentially small "company towns" like the one at
issue in Marsh.8 2 But by 1976, the Court reversed course and decided
that malls were more like small businesses in a cooperative, and there-
fore, private guards were not state actors.83 By the 1970s the lines
between public police and private security companies were once again
beginning to blur with partnerships becoming more common." Addi-
tionally, public police began to rely on private security to obtain evi-
dence that effectively circumvented constitutional requirements under
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments." This practice is currently
within legal bounds, so long as a court can find that there was a "legiti-
mate private purpose behind the search."86
B. Hybrid Policing: Public/Private Partnerships and the
Upsurge of Business Interests in Politics
As the law began to recognize the need to regulate policing, the
substantive due process pendulum swung from economic to individual
rights under the Warren Court. As it subsequently began to shift back
toward a focus on economic liberty rights, political campaign financing
regulations were one of the targets of the Court. This Section traces the
growth of public-private police partnerships within that landscape in
order to frame the current trajectory toward privatizing police.
1. THE RISE OF THE HYBRID SYSTEM
By the end of the 1960s, there were more public police in the
United States than private security personnel." By the 1970s, the trend
was slowing, with a ratio of 1.4 public police officers for every private
security officer." Estimates put the ratio of private to public police at
3:1 in the year 2000.89 The trend has only increased since that time, with
partnerships between public and private police soaring since September
82. Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,
317-18 (1968), overruled by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) & Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976).
83. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 520-21 (1976); Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 570 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
84. See Sklansky, The Private Police, supra note 12, at 1221.
85. See Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, supra note 5, at 114-17. Joh discusses the
"silver platter doctrine," whereby private police arrest and obtain evidence without regard for
constitutional considerations and hand it over to public police for use in prosecutions. See id. Joh
outlines its history and consequences in current practice. Id. The practice is within the law and
courts have consistently held that evidence obtained by private actors is admissible by the state to
prosecute defendants, even when it would be held inadmissible if obtained by state actors. Id.
86. Id. at 116-17 (quoting WAYNE LEFAVE ET AL., 1 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.7(f) (2004)).
87. Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, supra note 12, at 89 (citation omitted).
88. Job, The Paradox of Private Policing, supra note 5, at 54-55 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 55 (citation omitted).
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11, 2001.90 There are two ways that public police forces partner with
private security companies: 1) by sharing information to enhance overall
crime prevention and investigation and 2) by outsourcing support ser-
vices.9' In either of these two models, the State Action Doctrine would
generally apply as long as the public police entity "authorizes, encour-
ages, or facilitates" the private activity.92
As of 2006, there were approximately 450 partnerships between
public law enforcement and private security entities. 93 Those partner-
ships include sharing information between public and private police, but
also providing additional patrols for special events and policing quasi-
private property. 94 For example, a private security firm patrols 100 pub-
lic housing buildings in Boston; the firm includes 165 private guards, 43
of which are designated as "special police officers" with limited arrest
powers. These systems of cooperation have been encouraged, and in
many instances, funded by the federal government.96 These partnerships
have also been embraced by the highest levels of state and local law
enforcement management.
Many police departments also utilize the services of private compa-
nies to carry out duties that were once entirely the purview of the public
department. Such contracts have been in use since at least the 1950s but
have become much more common in the last twenty years as depart-
ments seek to save resources.98 Those services include emergency
response or 911 dispatching," towing impounded vehicles,' data entry,
90. See THE LAW ENFORCEMENT-PRIVATE SECURITY CONSORTIUM, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
OPERATION PARTNERSHIP: TRENDS AND PRACTICES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY
COLLABORATIONS 8, 46-48 (2009).
91. See id. at 6.
92. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PoLICIES 539 (4th ed.
2011).
93. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT-PRIVATE SECURITY CONSORTIUM, supra note 90, at 40.
94. See id. at 44 (explaining how private companies assist with events like NASCAR races,
security in Business Improvement Districts, and disaster relief efforts, including Hurricane
Katrina); see also Griff Witte, Private Security Contractors Head to Gulf, WASH. POST, Sept.
8, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/07/AR2005090702214.
html.
95. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT-PRIVATE SECURITY CONSORTIUM, supra note 90, at 44.
96. See id. at 47.
97. See id. at 40.
98. See Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, supra note 12, at 614 & n.227.
99. See, e.g., Michael Ratcliffe, Council Approves Privatization of Police/911 Dispatching,
LAWRENCEVILLE PATCH (Jan. 22, 2013, 4:27 AM), http://lawrenceville.patch.com/articles/council-
approves-privatization-of-police-91 1-dispatching (noting New Jersey township's decision to
outsource 911 services to Georgia-based private company iXP with union and public outcry
against plan); OLIVER W. PORTER, CREATING THE NEW CITY OF SANDY SPRINGS: THE 2 1ST
CENTURY PARADIGM: PRIVATE INDUSTRY 111-12 (2006) (discussing contracting provisions for all
police, fire, and dispatch services with Fulton County, Georgia).
100. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, supra note 12, at 613.
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and crime lab analysis."o' Aside from 911 dispatching, such contracted
services do not tend to garner much opposition because these are not
force-protection activities, but rather support services. 102
2. POLITICS AND MONEY: THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPE
AFTER THE WARREN COURT
While policing became more heavily regulated after World War II,
substantive due process interpretation began to shift from economic to
individual liberty rights under the Warren Court. 03 Unlike the Lochner
Court, the Warren Court granted the federal government wide latitude to
pass laws banning discrimination, which was in line with the cultural
shifts in society.'0 While both Courts interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to include substantive due process rights, the Warren Court
applied them wholly differently by finding that they existed primarily to
protect fundamental personal rights of citizens, albeit using very similar
logic to apply them. It should not come as a surprise that very few
judges or scholars since the end of the Great Depression have outwardly
embraced the Lochner Court's vision,105 but in resting on its founda-
tions, the "liberal" Warren Court rehabilitated the same jurisprudence
while avoiding the haunting label Lochner conveys.
Currently, the Supreme Court has begun to shift back toward an
economic liberty interpretation of substantive due process rights, with a
priority placed on curbing government regulation; it is here that priva-
tization is gaining momentum. While Citizens United marks a historical
change in campaign finance laws, corporate personhood did not begin
with the Supreme Court's ruling in that case.106 The question of corpo-
101. Fairfax, supra note 3, at 275.
102. See id. at 273-75.
103. Earl Warren served as Chief Justice from 1953-1969. As the Women's Rights and Civil
Rights movements came into fruition, the Court, under the supervision of Chief Justice Earl
Warren, began to hear challenges based on alleged violations of fundamental and substantive due
process rights. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954), the Court applied
the Equal Protection Clause in finding segregation a direct violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, holding that separate but equal educational facilities did not cure the harm caused by
segregated schools. The Court began to use reasoning first encountered in the Lochner era during
this period, and applied its broad interpretation of substantive due process rights in cases involving
personal rather than economic rights. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967), the Court
struck down the state's Racial Integrity Act of 1924 on both equal protection and due process
grounds, holding marriage to be a fundamental right, as well as determining that the law was
primarily intended to perpetuate white supremacy. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485-86 (1965) (holding that married couples have a fundamental right to possess and use
contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (extending the right to possess
and use contraception to unmarried people).
104. See, e.g., supra note 103.
105. See generally, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 44.
106. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, at 315.
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rate constitutional rights started in 1886 when the Court recognized
Fourteenth Amendment protections on behalf of a corporation. 0 This
recognition was not part of the Court's decision in the case-it was sim-
ply inserted into the syllabus-but it became accepted as law.'0 The
cases decided during the Lochner era continued to grant corporations
Fourteenth Amendment protections in matters pertaining to contracts
and employment, so whether corporations should enjoy constitutional
rights that living and breathing citizens possess has not been in question
.for the last 100 years.'" Even in matters related to political speech, the
Court has previously recognized a corporation's right to participate in
political discussion by granting it First Amendment rights.110 Laws that
entirely ban the use of corporate funds to affect or influence political
activity are a presumptive violation of the First Amendment absent a
showing of compelling government interest."'
Various efforts have been made to limit spending that might influ-
ence elections by groups or corporations in order to preserve faith in the
democratic process.1 12 Some limitations have been permitted and others
overruled. In 1971, Congress passed legislation attempting to codify the
disparate laws and streamline their applications."' However, some pro-
visions of that legislation were struck down by the Court, which held
that they violated the First Amendment rights of corporations and indi-
vidual groups, while other provisions remained unaffected. 1'4 Since
1947, however, the method by which most unions, corporations and
individual groups have spent money to influence the electorate has been
through Political Action Committees ("PACs")." Campaign finance
107. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
108. Id.; John A. Powell & Stephen Menendian, Beyond Public/Private: Understanding
Excessive Corporate Prerogative, 100 Ky. L.J. 43, 99 (2011).
109. See Powell & Menendian, supra note 108, at 112-14.
110. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784, 788 n.26 (1978) (protecting
commercial speech regarding ballot initiative but acknowledging dangers of direct financing to
candidates).
11l. Id. at 786 (citing Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
112. See Tillman Act of 1907, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2012); Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 2
U.S.C. §§ 241-248 (1925), repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431-442 (2012); 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2012). The Federal Election
Campaign Act created the Federal Election Commission. 2 U.S.C. § 437c.
113. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442.
114. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1976) (upholding limits on direct campaign
contributions and disclosure requirements but striking provisions that curbed spending by
campaigns, by individuals using personal money to run for office, and by independent groups on
issues related to elections).
115. See Adam Winkler, "Other People's Money": Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign
Finance Law, 92 GEo L.J. 871, 935 (2004) (citation omitted); see also Jeremy G. Mallory, Still
Other People's Money: Reconciling Citizens United with Abood and Beck, 47 CAL. W. L. REv. 1,
25-28 (2010).
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laws prior to 2002 banned direct contributions by corporations and labor
unions to influence federal elections, except through segregated volunta-
rily contributed funds to the general treasury, which could be spent on
federal races."' 6
Unlimited "soft money," or individual contributions not coordi-
nated with candidates in state and local elections, created an atmosphere
wherein PACs were spending millions of dollars on issue-related adver-
tising that avoided direct endorsements but created political pressure to
change campaign finance laws in order to curb the limitless flow of cash
that had at least the appearance of buying the candidates." 7 Congress
attempted to address the problem of "soft money," passing legislation
commonly referred to as McCain-Feingold in 2002.'" That law sub-
jected political parties to federal spending limits and banned corpora-
tions and non-profit groups from financing what it defined as
"electioneering communications," which was issue-related advertising
that named a candidate within thirty days of a primary and sixty days of
a general federal election." 9 Challenged in 2003, the law was upheldl20
and remained unchanged until 2007, when the Supreme Court ruled that
the thirty- and sixty-day bans were unreasonable infringements on First
Amendment rights, unless the advertising in question included an out-
right endorsement of a candidate.' 2 ' In 2008, the Court further limited
the law by striking the "millionaire's amendment," a provision intended
to level the playing field between wealthy candidates and those who
could not afford to bankroll their own campaigns.122 The Court was
clearly signaling that its majority in those decisions had serious reserva-
tions about campaign spending limitations as they related to the First
Amendment.
C. Continuing Trends in the Law and Privatization Schemes
As the Supreme Court began dismantling government regulation of
116. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b; Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660
(1990) (prohibited corporations from directly spending money to influence campaigns but
permitted "independent political expenditures [made] through separate segregated funds"),
overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010); see also Winkler, supra note 115,
at 935.
117. See Winkler, supra note 115, at 935-36.
118. Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002 § 101, Pub. L. No.
107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 82-86 (2002).
119. See id. § 201(3)(A), 116 Stat. at 89.
120. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 114, 246 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 365.
121. FEC v. Wisc. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457-58, 481 (2007).
122. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 729, 740 (2008) (striking provision that limited amount of
personal funds a candidate could use in his or her campaign).
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campaign donations, private entities began to look for more ways to
influence political actors. This Section analyzes the return to an eco-
nomic liberty rights focus within the law that allows business interests to
play a larger role in politics. Additionally, it explores the types of police
privatization proposals currently being considered and how presumed
economic distress plays a role in shaping them.
1. RETURN TO ECONOMIC LIBERTY RIGHTS AND
POLITICAL INFLUENCE
In laying the groundwork to limit government power over large
business interests, the current Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Roberts
at its helm, has carved out a space in which corporations are granted the
same constitutional rights as citizens and the federal government is lim-
ited in its ability to regulate the activities of those corporations. The
focus of this Section is this space and how it came to exist in the context
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. How corporations
participate in democracy reveals the extent to which that influence can
potentially usurp the will of the individual voter. The financial influence
is not partisan; it is also not always certain to garner a victory for a
preferred candidate, but it is powerful. To ignore the speech that money
amplifies is to analyze privatization in a convenient vacuum of demo-
cratic and economic altruism-conditions which increasingly cease to
exist in any pure form in the context of electoral politics.
In 2010, the Court came down with its highly controversial deci-
sion in Citizens United, holding that Congress could not limit indepen-
dent spending by corporations or unions on "electioneering
communications," gutting McCain-Feingold once and for all. 12 3 The
Court found no compelling government interest in limiting corporate
spending during elections, holding that corporations had as much right
under the First Amendment to influence elections as any other citizen. 24
The Court went further, stating that "[t]he appearance of influence or
access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our
democracy. By definition, an independent expenditure is political speech
presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate." 25
As long as there is no actual quid pro quo between a candidate and the
corporation, the Court declared that there would be no appearance of
corruption.126 The dissent wasted no time accusing the majority of
123. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365-68 (overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and reinstating Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and First Nat'1 Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
124. Id. at 340-41.
125. Id. at 360 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46).
126. See id. at 359.
652 [Vol. 68:633
THE SIREN IS CALLING
returning to the kind of reasoning most often associated with the Loch-
ner Court.127
While Citizens United dealt with campaign spending regulations,
the Court has now overturned limits on direct campaign contributions,
overturning the aggregate limitations upheld in Buckley.'28 In Citizens
United, the Court defined independent expenditures as speech delivered
directly to the electorate, and held that no appearance of corruption
could be assumed since that message was not coordinated with any par-
ticular candidate.129 Now the Court has found that even large direct con-
tributions to candidates do not risk corrupting the process, a more
significant step toward deregulating campaign financing.130 In McCutch-
eon v. FEC, the Court struck down aggregate donation limits-the total
amount any one donor may give in a two-year election cycle to federal
candidates and non-candidate party committees. 13 1 It left in place "base
limits" for candidates, parties and their PACs, but removed restrictions
on individual donors who may now contribute the maximum allowable
to each.' 32 Narrowly defining corruption as an explicit quid pro quo, the
Court held that any limitations beyond the base limits represent a viola-
tion of the First Amendment.' 33 Acknowledging that large money
donors procure influence with politicians, the Court still found that such
influence is not a danger to the democratic process and does not rise to
the level of corruption.
The direction the Court took in overturning McCain-Feingold and
the portion of Buckley permitting aggregate limits, as well as in striking
127. Id. at 479 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In a democratic society, the longstanding consensus
on the need to limit corporate campaign spending should outweigh the wooden application of
judge-made rules. The majority's rejection of this principle 'elevate[s] corporations to a level of
deference which has not been seen at least since the days when substantive due process was
regularly used to invalidate regulatory legislation thought to unfairly impinge upon established
economic interests."' (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos., 435 U.S. at 817 n.13. (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting))).
128. McCutcheon v. FEC, No. 12-536 (Apr. 2, 2014) (striking two-year aggregate limits but
upholding base limits).
129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
130. See McCutcheon, slip op. at 19 ("Spending large sums of money in connection with
elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder's official
duties, does not give rise to . . . quid pro quo corruption.").
131. See generally id.
132. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2012). Base limits represent the total amount each candidate and
committee may accept from an individual donor during each election cycle. These limits were left
in place while the aggregate limits, which capped the total amount a donor could contribute in
each two-year election cycle, were overturned. See McCutcheon, slip op. at 13, 19.
133. See McCutcheon, slip op. at 20 ("The line between quid pro quo corruption and general
influence may seem vague at times, but the distinction must be respected in order to safeguard
basic First Amendment rights.").
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down a Supreme Court case decided as recently as 2003,134 indicates a
willingness to ignore recent precedent and shift its thinking where gov-
ernment regulation is concerned. The reasoning the majority used to
overturn these regulations looks very similar to the Court's thinking dur-
ing the Lochner era. While a large majority of individuals and small
business owners oppose the ruling in Citizens United,'3 5 the Court has
doubled down on its unpopular decision, reversing a Montana Supreme
Court decision that upheld a 1912 voter-approved ban on corporate
political campaign expenditure."' The current Supreme Court has
clearly indicated that corporations have certain constitutional rights, spe-
cifically with respect to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It is the
Court's holding-that corporate "liberty" is just as important as individ-
ual human "liberty"-that makes this Court look so much like the Loch-
ner Court. The Lochner Court appeared to many people as unconcerned
with the difficulties suffered by workers at the hands of employers and
unable to recognize a need for the government to step in to protect cer-
tain classes of citizens whose bargaining power was so much weaker
than the large companies who extracted their labor. Presently, a similar
cognitive dissonance exists that harkens back to that age and makes Citi-
zens United look like a harbinger of things to come. It is against this
backdrop that privatization of heretofore public force-protection has
begun to find momentum.
2. POCKETS OF RESISTANCE: PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE
There are two primary efforts underway to change the existing
model of public police services.m The first involves outsourcing the
entire force to another jurisdiction that remains within the public domain
but allowing a municipality to annul existing contracts and start anew.' 38
These types of proposals have met with mixed success, with some
134. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365-68 (2010).
135. E.g., Small Businesses Reject Role of Money in Politics; View Citizens United Decision as
Bad for Business, AM. SUSTAINABLE Bus. COUNCIL (Jan. 18, 2012), http://asbcouncil.org/sites/
default/files/files/pollresultsmoneyin-politics.pdf; In Supreme Court Ruling on Campaign
Finance, the Public Dissents, ABC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/
politics/2010/02/in-supreme-court-ruling-on-campaign-finance-the-public-dissents.
136. Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam).
137. See Job, Conceptualizing the Private Police, supra note 12, at 614 & n.230 (discussing
attempts in the 1990s to privatize several public forces).
138. See, e.g., Adam Elmahrek, City Council Members Allege Widespread Police Union
Bullying, VOICE OF OC (Aug. 28, 2012, 5:01 PM), http://www.voiceofoc.org/oc-coast/article
a5185e5c-fl6c-l lel-a44f-0019bb2963f4.html (discussing allegation outsourcing plan failed
because of intimidation and union bullying of Fullerton, California, city council members); Josh
Marshall, Saginaw Police Union Files Grievances Against the City, MINBCNEWS.COM, (Feb. 18,
2013, 7:09 PM), http://www.minbcnews.com/news/story.aspxid=862316#.UxSjtNyuCG8 (noting
plan moving forward and police fired in outsourcing to county force plan).
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schemes already in their implementation phase and others struggling to
survive.'39 Still other plans have been defeated, usually by a mix of pub-
lic concern and police union pressure.'40 The second type of model that
has not yet found its mark is the privatization of a force-selling it to a
private company entirely.' 4 1 Such plans have been offered and thus far
defeated but keep resurfacing with increasing frequency.'42 This Subpart
examines both models.
a. Outsourcing to Larger Municipalities
In 2012, the city of Camden, New Jersey, decided to dissolve its
contract with the Camden Police Department and launch a new county-
wide division called the Camden Police Metro Division.143 The county
freeholders voted for the measure, and while there was some outcry,
primarily from local unions, there was less consternation than other out-
sourcing plans have faced.' 44 The new county department could theoreti-
cally cover all municipalities within Camden county that wish to join
it-thirty-seven in total-but as of the spring of 2014, the new county-
wide department covers only one of them: the city of Camden.14 5 Cam-
den is one of the poorest cities in the state-and has the state's highest
murder rate-so when the county decided to scrap the existing union
contracts and propose something new, few showed up to protest.14 6 The
national news minimally covered the story, but given the desperate con-
ditions of poverty and crime, coupled with what many viewed as overly
generous wage and pension obligations, this plan was met with little
resistance beyond a vocal local minority.'47 In addition, the Camden
police have had such a contentious relationship with the public-includ-
ing numerous charges of police misconduct-that they found few cham-
139. See, e.g., Jason Laday, Camden City, County Will Continue Regional Police Plan Without
Union, S. JERSEY TIMES, Mar. 18, 2013, http://www.nj.com/camden/index.ssf/2013/01/camden_
city-county-officials-p.html.
140. See, e.g., Dumke, supra note 9.
141. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 10.
142. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
143. Darran Simon & Claudia Vargas, Financial Details Outlined for Camden Regional Police
Force, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 30, 2012, http://articles.philly.com/2012-08-30/news/33500354_
1_regional-police-force-county-force-police-budget.
144. Compare id. with Ratcliffe, supra note 99 (discussing an hour-long public comment
period generally opposing the privatization of emergency responses in Lawrence, New Jersey).
145. Kate Zernike, To Fight Crime, a Poor City Will Trade in Its Police, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 29,
2012, at Al.
146. Id.
147. Id. (Before being disbanded, the salary range for the department was $47,000-$81,000,
including 3-11% bonuses for staying on the job beyond five years and shift bonuses that included
an extra 4% for the day and 10% for a night shift. With a generous sick-time allowance, the
average absentee rate was 30% per shift.).
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pions among those they were sworn to protect. 148
The plan called for an increase in police officers-from 273 to
400-which the county hopes will stem the tide of crime.149 Having just
been implemented in May 2013, the success of the transition is yet
unknown, although overall crime rates have declined.' The old police
force was given an opportunity to join the Metro Division-albeit with
major wage and benefits concessions; originally told only 49% of
existing officers would be hired for the new force, the union sued to stop
the plan."' The county then offered to transfer any officers that wanted
to move to the new force along with a more generous set of conditions,
including the right to retain collective bargaining rights and keep their
existing pension and medical benefits.15 2 However, they would also be
required to drop the lawsuit, forfeit their existing contract, and give up
any earned status for their years on the force. 153 The union voted over-
whelmingly against the offer and decided to pin their hopes on the law-
suit.154 The union vote did nothing to prevent officers from applying to
the new force and organizing as a new union; however, since they voted
148. See, e.g., ACLU OF N.J., THE CRISIS CONTINUES INSIDE POLICE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 3
(2013), available at htpp://www.aclu-nj.org/files/3413/6059/3876/ACLUNJ InternalAffairs.pdf
(noting in follow-up to 2009 report showing inadequate response to civilian complaints, that in
2012, "[o]nce again a majority of local departments provided inaccurate information in response
to the most basic questions regarding individuals' rights to file . . . complaints."); Camden Agrees
to Pay $3.5 Million to Victims of Police Corruption, ACLU OF N.J. (Jan. 10, 2013), https://www.
aclu.org/criminal-law-reform/camden-agrees-pay-35m-victims-police-corruption (noting that one
officer was convicted and three officers pled guilty to corruption for planting evidence, falsifying
reports and perjury leading to settlement with 88 citizens); Matt Katz, Camden Police Scandal
Has Widespread Consequences, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 21, 2010, http://www.philly.com/philly/
news/year-in-review/20100221_Camden-police-scandal has-widespreadconsequences.html.
149. See Zernike, supra note 145; see also Matt Skoufalos, Camden FOP Votes down County
Offer, Braces for Legal Fight, COLLINGSWOOD PATCH (Feb. 4, 2013, 3:42 AM), http://collings
wood.patch.com/articles/camden-f-o-p-votes-down-county-offer-braces-for-legal-fight ("In 2007,
we were the number five most dangerous city. For the last five years we have ranked [number
one] or [number two]. In 2008, we had over 350 officers. In 2010, we had 393 officers." (quoting
Camden City Fraternal Order of Police President John Williamson about whether more police
would result in less criminal activity)).
150. See Heather Haddon & Ricardo Kaulessar, Crime Dips in Camden as New County Police
Force Replaces City Officers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2013, http://online.wsj. com/article/SB 1000
1424127887323968704578650171849946106.htm; Joe Green, For Camden Officials, 2013 Drop
in Crime and Homicides a Step in Right Direction, S. JERSEY TIMES, Jan. 3, 2014, http://www.nj.
com/camden/index.ssf/2014/01/forcamdenofficials_2013dropincrimehomicides is_a.just
a-step-in.right-direction.html (noting force not at full capacity but 15% drop in homicides from
2012 to 2013).
151. See Zemike, supra note 145; Laday, supra note 139 (noting union lawsuit against city
continuing after union voted against plan).
152. Jason Laday, Camden FOP Leaders Reviewing Offer from Freeholders on Regional
Police Department, S. JERSEY TIMES, Jan. 15, 2013, http://www.nj.com/gloucester-county/index.
ssf/2013/01/camdenfopleaders reviewingo.html.
153. Id.
154. See Laday, supra note 139.
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against the offer, the county said it could only hire 49% of the existing
officers. 5 5
The Camden regionalization idea is not a new one: other municipal-
ities have proposed similar plans to outsource their services to larger,
nearby forces.' 5 6 Those municipalities have been much smaller, how-
ever, and even they faced enormous resistance from their local commu-
nities.157 Moreover, their plans involve folding in their services with
already-existing departments that can extend services to them; in no
other case has a municipality created a broader regional force to fold
itself into that did not already exist and included no other municipalities.
The Camden plan is significant because it uses a beleaguered city as a
test case for other large municipalities to shed contracts and start
anew-without the burden of long-term obligations-by creating a new
police department with a new name.15 8 But perhaps more importantly, as
will be discussed below, 5 9 this innovative plan allows for some analysis
of the convergence of political influence and dwindling revenue streams
that provides opportunities to upend public services without much
resistance.
b. Privatization of the Public Police
There are numerous examples of cities using private security to bol-
ster existing forces, usually financed by neighborhood associations,
known as Business Improvement Districtsl 60-but in those partnerships
155. See id.
156. See Charles B. Stockdale, Cities That Have Fired Their Police Forces, 24/7 WALL ST.
(Dec. 13, 2011), http://247wallst.com/2011/12/13/cities-that-have-fired-their-police-forces/ (cities
include Pewaukee, Wisconsin, in 2009; Maywood, California, San Carlos, California, and Pontiac,
Michigan, in 2010; Millbrae, California, and Youngstown, Arizona, in 2011; noting that all have
populations under 30,000 except Pontiac, which was under control of an emergency city
manager); Gideon Rubin, Pacifica City Manager Mum on Move to Kibosh Police Outsourcing
Plan, PACIFICA PATCH (Aug. 21, 2012, 1:53 AM), http://pacifica.patch.com/articles/pacifica-city-
manager-mum-on-move-to-kibosh-police-outsourcing-plan (discussing closed session meetings on
proposal to outsource local police service to the sherriff's department and decision to stop
pursuing that plan); Brett Dickie, Saginaw Residents Show Support for Police Department,
MINBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 19, 2013, 9:46 PM), http://www.minbcnews.com/news/story.aspx?id=
862862#.UyHhMIFdWUA (discussing the layoff of police officers to close budget gap amid
ongoing consideration of outsourcing plan to county sheriff department); Richard Winton,
Fullerton City Council Rejects Move to Consider Disbanding Police, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/09/local/la-me-fullerton-20120809 (noting that city council
voted against outsourcing Fullerton, California, police service to Orange County Sherriff
Department 3 to 2, despite ongoing criticism of the department).
157. See supra note 156.
158. See Simon & Vargas, supra note 143.
159. See infra Part III.A.
160. See THE LAW ENFORCEMENT-PRIVATE SECURITY CONSORTIUM, supra note 90 at 40,
119-20 (listing several formal law enforcement and private security partnerships in such places
such as Chicago, Boston, and Dallas).
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the local police still operate as the de facto public police force with the
private officers permitted only limited powers.161 Attempts to sell the
wholesale delivery of force-protection to private companies have not yet
succeeded, but the idea has been considered, and given current trends,
plans to sell off entire departments are likely not far from realization.162
Moreover, other cities have been slowly blurring the public and private
lines. One such example is the use of public funding to hire private
forces while concurrently shrinking the public force.163 The reverse of
that is essentially a system of leasing public police to private companies
that pay the department in return for the benefits of having an officer
with public police powers, including taxpayer indemnification of the
company in case of litigation.164
One such effort to privatize the entire force was attempted in Foley,
Minnesota, in 201 1.165 There, the city council voted to hire a private
contractor to take over all policing duties and dismiss its entire force.16 6
It would have saved the town of 2,600 residents $53,000 per year.167
Foley had already outsourced its patrol services to a nearby sheriff unit
in 2003, but further budget cuts pushed the small municipality to find
ways to save more on public safety. 6 8 The deal did not go through when
the private company declined to sign the contract, in large part because
of the difficulty in determining how state action issues and tort liability
161. See Joh, The Forgotten Threat, supra note 12, at 379-84 (discussing the different types of
partnerships and division of accountability); Beth Slovic, Debate About Security in Downtown
Portland Parks Continues: Portland City Hall Roundup, THE OREGONIAN (Dec. 13, 2011, 10:26
AM), http://blog.oregonlive.com/portlandcityhall/2011/12/debateabout_security-in-downt.html
(discussing ongoing debates about private security patrols in downtown Portland).
162. E.g., Nancy Bean Foster, Weare Mulled Replacing Police Department with Private
Security Company, THE BEDFORD BULLETIN (Oct. 4, 2013, 11:42 PM), http://www.newhampshire.
com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20131005/NEWSO7/131009579/-I /newhampshire 14&template=
newhampshire 1408 ("According to Robert Tanenholt of Greystone International, the company has
never run a police department in the United States, but said that privatized police departments are
on the horizon. 'It's something that's starting to raise its head in towns and cities,' said Tenenholt.
Budgets, unions, and other issues are behind the interest in privatizing departments, Tanenholt
said, but 'we've never done this before.'").
163. See Brendan McCarthy, N.O. Residents Increasingly Turning to Private Police Patrols,
wwerv (Nov. 1, 2012, 5:17 PM), http://www.wwltv.com/news/eyewitness/brendanmccarthy/
brendan-maps- 176820771 .html.
164. See Wolf, supra note 10.
165. Kari Petrie & Kirsti Marohn, Minn. Town to Replace Police with Private Security Force,
USATODAY (Nov. 14, 2011, 10:01 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/201 I -
11-14/police-private-security-foley/51194090/1.
166. Id.
167. Andrew Strickler, The Force Is Not with You: Cash-Strapped Minnesota Town Hires
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would apply.169 There was not a great deal of support for the idea, even
within the town council, and Foley decided to rebuild its local police
without the assistance of even the county sheriff.'
While the plans to outsource or privatize police have been met with
mixed reaction among the public, there are serious questions that must
be addressed because these various plans continue to find their way into
the halls of government on an ever-increasing basis. There may be plans
that make fiscal sense but are not worth the risks for public safety; at the
same time, there are many different ways that outsourcing and privatiza-
tion play a role for local governments in contexts outside of policing.
Therefore, the next Part considers the costs and benefits of systems that
seek to shed public police services.
I. PROS AND CONS OF PRIVATIZATION AND
OUTSOURCING OF THE POLICE
A. Could Privatizing the Police Be Beneficial?
1. EcoNoMic UNCERTAINTY REQUIRES A SOLUTION
State budgets have been operating with large shortfalls since 2008,
and many still suffer the consequences of a sluggish housing market,
high unemployment, and accompanying debt associated with the reces-
sion.17 ' Despite projections that revenue will increase by 4.1% in 2013,
states still report an average increase in spending of only 2.2% in
2013.172 Whether because of mistrust in the economic recovery or ideo-
logically driven motives, the move to shrink budgets will continue
unabated for the foreseeable future. ' In surveys that reflect city
finances, the outlook is often bleak, in part because of declining support
from federal and state governmental disbursements,174 but also because
of underfunded pensions and health care obligations.' 7 5 So the fiscal
problems are real where they truly exist, if also currently overstated.
With depressed revenues, municipalities could see real savings in
169. See Conrad Wilson, Foley Private Security Deal on Hold, MINN. PuB. RADIO (Jan. 5,
2012, 5:58 PM), http://blogs.mpmews.org/statewide/2012/01/foley-private-security-deal-on-
hold/.
170. Conrad Wilson, Foley to Re-Start Police Department, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2012/02/22/foley-police-department.
171. See NAT' L GOVERNORs Ass'N, supra note 6, at vii (noting the trend of state budget
revenues and shortfalls since 2008 and projecting slow growth in 2013).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Pagano et al., supra note 6, at 5 ("Leading factors that city finance officers report to have
decreased are levels of federal aid (5 1%), state aid (50%), the local tax base (47%) and the health
of the local economy (42%).").
175. Id. at 9.
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reforming police services. According to some estimates, private security
officers make an average of 47% less than their public counterparts. 17 6
In a privately run system willing to bifurcate police services, some tasks
could be performed by trained sworn officers, while others could be han-
dled by a second-tier force at a much lower cost to the municipality. 177
The wage structure, handled by a company, affords the greatest opportu-
nity to keep costs down. Unlike a union model, where wages are based
on seniority or rank, a private company can set the terms and institute a
performance-based structure.17 8 In an outsourced situation like Camden,
the savings are immediate because the entire force is released from its
contract and a new, lower wage structure is put into place. 179 Moreover,
the very threat of outsourcing or privatization may be sufficient to com-
pel union officers to renegotiate salary and benefits in a more favorable
direction for the municipality.'1s
Beyond wages, the benefits obligations for municipalities are cited
as a major impediment to balancing budgets.'"' Committing to long-
term pensions and health insurance is expensive and carries unforesee-
able market fluctuations. 1 82 When municipalities look for approaches to
cutting spending, those benefits can become a lucrative target.1 83 Given
the nature of private contracts, such obligations can be shed entirely by
municipalities that can simply draw a fiscal line in the sand and allow
private companies to handle such issues. In addition to cost savings,
there is the added benefit of control and predictability.
Competition is another possible benefit of outsourcing and priva-
tization that may affect not only cost but also efficiency, as it has argua-
bly done in other contexts. 184 Private security companies already exist in
the market, so competition is already built into the framework. If the
176. See Erwin A. Blackstone & Simon Hakim, Private Policing: Experiences, Evaluation and
Future Direction, in HANDBOOK ON THE EcONOMICS OF CIME 359, 362 (Bruce L. Benson & Paul
R. Zimmerman eds., 2010).
177. Erwin A. Blackstone & Simon Hakim, Privatizing the Police, THE MILKEN INST. REV. 54,
57 (2010) ("Private armed officers guard the transit systems of Miami and St. Louis. Private
armed guards earning $34,000 a year are being substituted in Hernando County, Fla., for sheriffs
deputies earning about twice as much. The Southfield, Mich., Police Department cut the cost of
processing newly arrested prisoners in half by hiring the Wackenhut Corporation to do the job.").
178. See id. at 58.
179. See Zernike, supra note 145.
180. See Blackstone & Hakim, supra note 176, at 375.
181. See Pagano et al., supra note 6, at 6, 9.
182. Daniel J. Kaspar, Defined Benefits, Undefined Costs: Moving Toward a More
Transparent Accounting of State Public Employee Pension Plans, 3 WM. & MARY PoL'Y REV.
129, 143 (2011) (discussing lack of uniform accounting foundation to predict market fluctuations
leading to pensions being underfunded).
183. See Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension
Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 263 & n.3 (2011).
184. See Paul Guppy, Policy Brief: Private Prisons and the Public Interest: Improving Quality
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public is concerned that profit motives will result in negative conse-
quences for the public, the threat of competition may compel acceptable
behavior, born of self-interest.185
2. LACK OF PUBLIC TRUST IN EXISTING MODEL
Police corruption, brutality, racial profiling, and general disre-
spect-mostly for the poor-are problems in cities big and small.1 6
That the general public may have concerns about a private force is
understandable in a visceral sense, but given minimal public outcry in
Camden, distrust of privatization may not play a large role in cities that
already have a history of police malfeasance.18 7 Given that history, one
of the most vital concerns to address is accountability.'18  If robust
accountability can be assured, then public trust can be established. Priva-
tization could open the door to new opportunities to create regulations
and establish protocols that do not currently exist. 89 For example, the
"blue wall of silence" 90 could be addressed by contracting that reflects
stiff penalties for noncompliance with vigorous government oversight.
Additionally, competition and other incentives might address con-
cerns that profits will be the top priority for private enterprise.1 91 With
whistleblower protection offered to individual officers, it is possible that
the public could build trust in a private force more than one represented
by a union without a robust regulatory system of redress. Further, any
fear that private companies would be reluctant to report levels of crimi-
nal activity in a bid to demonstrate success may be unfounded because
and Reducing Cost Through Competition, WASH. POL'Y CTR. 3 (Feb. 2003), available at http://
www.washingtonpolicy.org/sites/default/files/PrisonPubliclnterestPB.pdf.
185. See Volokh, supra note 2, at 150 (discussing accountability and competition in the private
prison context).
186. See Julian Darwall & Martin Guggenheim, Funding the People's Right, 15 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 619, 639-41 (2012) (citing a lack of oversight in criminal justice system as
cause for disrespect and police corruption); Megan Cottrell, Chicago Spent over $63 Million
Defending Police Misconduct: Study, CHI. REP. (May 21, 2012, 3:55 PM), http://www.
chicagonow.com/chicago-muckrakers/2012/05/chicago-spent-over-63-million-defending-police-
misconduct-study/ (discussing the costs of police misconduct).
187. See Martin Guggenheim, The People's Right to a Well-Funded Indigent Defender System,
36 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 395, 464 (2012) (citing numerous instances of evidence
tampering and police corruption across the United States).
188. See generally Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003).
189. See Volokh, supra note 2, at 149.
190. Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias and
Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Prrr. L. Rev. 233, 237 (1998) ("Police
officers also sometimes lie under oath because of the 'blue wall of silence,' an unwritten code in
many departments which prohibits disclosing perjury or other misconduct by fellow officers, or
even testifying truthfully if the facts would implicate the conduct of a fellow officer." (citations
omitted)).
191. See generally Volokh, supra note 2.
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rigorous reporting can be monitored by independent public agencies and
citizens. 19 2 It is notable that problems exist currently with the use of the
public police monitored system called CompStat,19 3 which some argue
has been very successful in tracking statistical data and crime patterns
but has had the collateral effect of incentivizing police to underreport
crime to keep those statistics down. 94 At the very least, these provisions
have the potential to offer a model that is no worse than what many
citizens currently experience.
In Camden, some complained that the new officers would be unfa-
miliar with the neighborhoods and thus less able to understand the heart-
beat of the city, know its residents, and exhibit the care expected by the
populace. 19 5 But again, many had already lost trust.1 96 In places where
that concern is more applicable, the proper training, orientation, and
interaction with the people who live there can address these issues.'9 7 A
new force would not simply arrive in town on a particular day and begin
patrolling, but could craft a transitional and permanent police system
with members of the community and government. Such obstacles are
possible to overcome with proper coordination. It is also instructive that
hybrid systems currently in operation have produced no marked discord
because of familiarity issues;198 the public is accustomed to partial
privatization schemes and may be amenable to a broader effort.
3. EFFICIENCY AND How TO MAINTAIN IT
As mentioned above, competition is one way to compel private
companies to perform efficiently and to prioritize the needs of the com-
munity rather than simply prioritizing profits.199 Contracts can incen-
tivize companies to meet certain performance benchmarks or lose
192. See, e.g., N.Y.C. COMM'N TO COMBAT POLICE CORRUTFION, http://www.nyc.gov/html/
ccpc/html/home/home.shtml (last visited March 3, 2014) (established in 1995 as permanent
oversight committee with members appointed by mayor).
193. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing
"High-Crime Areas", 63 HAsTINrs L.J. 179, 192-95 (2011) (explaining CompStat origins and
uses as crime mapping and data management).
194. See generally John A. Eterno & Eli B. Silverman, The NYPD's Compstat: Compare
Statistics or Compose Statistics?, 3 Iwr'L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT 426 (2010).
195. See njopengovernment, Camden County Freeholders Meeting, YouTUBE (Sept. 24,
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vo680sBIRVI.
196. See ACLU OF N.J., supra note 148, at 3.
197. See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv. L.
REv. 1285, 1313 (2003) (discussing generally the benefit of including diverse members of
community in implementing social services and efficacy of partnership with private entities to
increase innovation in newly privatized public services).
198. See Joh, The Forgotten Threat, supra note 12, at 378-79.
199. See Guppy, supra note 184, at 3; Volokh, supra note 2, at 152 n.76.
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business; bonuses for exceeding them can also be negotiated. 2 ' For cit-
ies that prefer to fold their policing into a larger county-wide depart-
ment, these incentives can also be addressed through contracts. There
may be other nearby police departments that can compete for the busi-
ness, and the threat of full privatization also serves as an impetus to
perform to the standards set by the local government.201
Critics suggest that public services should remain within the control
of the government because private monopolies can gain too much power
and be difficult to eliminate, thereby becoming unanswerable to lack of
efficiency issues.2 02 However, police already operate as a monopoly
with a great amount of power to support local politicians who are willing
to meet contract demands in exchange for union support.203 With a pri-
vate entity, collective bargaining is much less likely. For states that have
implemented right-to-work laws, workers are even less likely to organ-
ize unions where dues are voluntary because so many workers can opt
out of carrying the cost of bargaining. 204 Even within the outsourcing
model, monopolization is no greater an issue than currently exists, even
if a new force organizes as a union.
One of the great benefits of private forces operating today is an
ability to fill gaps for public forces.2 05 When a security patrol handles
private property, public police can be deployed into high crime areas,
and their numbers can be increased.20 6 Private patrols already handle
low-level activities that do not require sworn police officers, like issuing
summonses, towing cars, and acting as an "eyes and ears" presence on
the street to deter crime.207 In an outsourcing model, a municipality can
200. See Freeman, supra note 197, at 1326.
201. See Blackstone & Hakim, supra note 177, at 59.
202. See Freeman, supra note 197, at 1336.
203. See Blackstone & Hakim, supra note 176, at 359, 373.
204. See Richard B. Freeman, What Can We Learn from the NLRA to Create Labor Law for
the Twenty-First Century?, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 327, 328 & n.8 (2011) (discussing Taft-
Hartley amendment allowing states to ban security clauses which would require union dues or fees
for the cost of collective bargaining activities, effectively weakening union organizing in those
right-to-work states (citing David T. Ellwood & Glenn Fine, The Impact of Right-to-Work Laws
on Union Organizing, 95 J. POL. EcON. 250, 268 (1987); William J. Moore, The Determinants and
Effects of Right-to-Work Laws: A Review of the Recent Literature, 19 J. LAB. REs. 445, 463
(1998))).
205. See Blackstone & Hakim, supra note 176, at 365.
206. See, e.g., id. at 369; THE LAw ENFORCEMENT-PRIVATE SECURITY CONSORTIUM, supra
note 90, at 8; see generally Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, Public Safety Through Private
Action: An Economic Assessment of BIDS, Locks, and Citizen Cooperation (Nat'l. Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15877, 2010), available at http://www.labidconsortium.org/
pdf/EconJournalMay201 1.pdf (discussing statistical analysis of private security effects on crime in
Los Angeles).
207. See Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, supra note 12, at 97; see also supra notes
99-100 and accompanying text.
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fire its current force, shed the associated contracts, and supplement the
county force with private security to handle non-essential police duties.
That type of system could provide enormous cost savings while crafting
the most efficient division of officers and remain flexible rather than
beholden to union requirements consistent with hiring and firing
officers.
4. ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY
Accountability and transparency are two areas of concern that must
and can be addressed with proper contracting and oversight.2 0 8 The
voice of the police must remain a government voice in order to ensure
public trust, but there are ways to accomplish that goal in a privatization
context. As with private prisons, a company can be tasked with perform-
ing certain duties while the government remains the ultimate arbiter of
the scope and regulation of the activity. Ultimately, the government
remains responsible to the public for the actions of the contractor.
In the specific context of policing, the State Action Doctrine covers
police services overseen and regulated by the state.209 While courts have
interpreted the doctrine's application to private actors in various and-
some would argue-muddled ways,2 10 there should be no lack of clarity
in any of the schemes this Article considers because the government is
directly contracting with and authorizing the actions of the private entity
on behalf of the public interest.
B. What Are the Potential Pitfalls in Privatizing and/or
Outsourcing the Police?
As the above Section outlines, in arguing for cost-saving measures,
proponents of police privatization contend that issues of accountability,
transparency, and ultimately public trust can be addressed through
proper implementation of laws and contracts. 21 1 However, there are
counterarguments that critics argue just as forcefully, and because con-
stitutional issues and the rule of law are implicated, those too must be
analyzed as the push for privatization continues into the area of
208. See Volokh, supra note 2, at 149-50 (discussing the possibility of enacting stronger
legislation to expand the State Action Doctrine to apply to private actors in the context of
policing).
209. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621-22 (1991) (finding state
action requires consideration of "[1] the extent to which the actor relies on governmental
assistance and benefits ... [2] whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function,
. . . and [3] whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of
governmental authority" (citations omitted)).
210. See generally Turner, supra note 5 (discussing the disparate approaches within the
Supreme Court and lower courts applying differing factors and weighting them unevenly).
211. See generally Volokh, supra note 2.
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policing.2 12
1. FINANCIAL BENEFITS AND PUBLIC COSTS
Dissolving contracts, breaking up unions, and hiring personnel at
lower wages with attenuated benefits is one way to save money,213 but
the question municipalities must ask is whether possible savings out-
weigh the potential consequences to public trust and safety. But even if
expense is the sole concern, or at least the top priority, there is some
question about whether privatizing criminal justice projects is always
cheaper. For example, studies have shown that private prisons are not
always less expensive than public prisons. 2 14 Even when some savings
can be achieved, one report on private prisons concluded that quality
was not better than in public counterparts.2 15 For police services, the
public may want to consider whether the savings are worth the potential
loss in quality in a privately managed system. Unlike prisons, which are
beyond the experience of the majority, the public encounters police reg-
ularly and may prioritize quality over costs if it means better training
and implementation of public safety measures.
Aside from quality, there is a risk that cost-savings in the realm of
lowered wages in one sector can affect other sectors as well. States have
projected more revenue than expenditure for fiscal year 2013.216 There
is growing political will to dissolve unions and privatize service across a
wide swath of the public sector,217 and there is some evidence to suggest
that these efforts are motivated by ideology rather than necessity.m
212. See generally Freeman & Minow, supra note 2.
213. See Edwards & Filion, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that in 2006, the federal government
spent $415 billion on private contracts employing 2 million people, of whom 20% earned below
the poverty threshold).
214. See Am. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., PRIVATE PRISONS: THE PUBLIC'S PROBLEM (2012),
available at http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/AFSCArizonaPrison_
Report.pdf ("Between 2008 and 2010, Arizona overpaid for its private prisons by about $10
million. If the requested 2,000 medium security private prison beds are built, Arizona taxpayers
can expect to waste at least $6 million."); Brad W. Lundahl, et al., Prison Privatization: A Meta-
Analysis of Cost and Quality of Confinement Indicators, 19 RES. ON Soc. WORK PRAc. 383, 383
(2009) (comparing costs and quality of confinement for private versus public prisons in 12 studies
and concluding that "[c]ost savings from privatizing prisons are not guaranteed and appear
minimal").
215. Id. at 392.
216. See supra Part II.A.1.
217. Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt & Winston Lin, The Great Recession, the Resulting Budget
Shortfalls, the 2010 Elections and the Attack on Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the United
States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 407, 413 (2012).
218. See Jeffrey Keefe, Issue Brief No. 249: Desperate Techniques Used to Preserve the Myth
of the Overcompensated Public Employee, EcON. POL'Y INST. (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://
s3.epi.org/files/page/-fIssueBrief294.pdf (noting 32% lower salaries for California public sector
workers than for similarly situated private sector workers).
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Given that ideology, rather than cost, may be the true motive behind
efforts to dissolve union contracts and pass laws to curb collective bar-
gaining rights, the public should be mindful of the collateral conse-
quences of privatization attempts. Prevailing wage laws exist as a buffer
against cheap labor, so if municipalities privatize services, the attendant
wage decline can depress other wages across the employment landscape,
not just in the privatized service area.2 19
2. PUBLIC TRUST AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Private companies exist to produce goods or services at a profit, so
when private companies serve a function that is normally performed by
the government, trust is important. After all, part of the social contract
requires some level of respect for the law and those who enforce it.
Companies, however, may have an incentive to underreport crime in
order to meet certain contractual obligations.2 2 0 While similar risks may
exist in the current structure because of reporting systems like Comp-
Stat,22' record-keeping relating to private prisons has also been vulnera-
ble to abuse. Related to the concern about underreporting is the
motivation for employees to fail to report abuses by their employers,
given that their livelihoods depend on their employer, not the
government.222
Allegiance to public service is an important factor that has been
tested recently with the implementation of quasi-privatization schemes
that lack transparency.2 2 3 In hybrid systems, partnerships generally
involve private security personnel who work for private employers and
public police who work for the state, but when those distinctions blur,
there is reason for concern about just whom the police are protecting.2 2 4
219. See Dau-Schmidt & Lin, supra note 217, at 425 ("The theory behind prevailing wage
laws is that the state is a powerful purchasing entity and should not enter the market to bid down
employees' wages. Thus, prevailing wage laws require that state contractors and subcontractors
pay their employees not less than the prevailing rate of pay, including fringe benefits, for work of
similar character in the county in which the work is performed.").
220. See Bob Ortega, Arizona Prison Oversight Lacking for Private Facilities: State Weighs
Expansion Even as Costs Run High, Amz. REPUBLIC (Aug. 7, 2011, 12:00 AM) http://www.
azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/08/07/20110807arizona-prison-private-oversight.html (finding
that private prisons did not meet contractual obligations and doing so would require laborious
monitoring).
221. See Eterno & Silverman, supra note 194.
222. See generally Parker Graham, Comment, Whistleblowers in the Workplace: The
Government Employee's "Official Duty" to Tell the Truth, 65 SMU L. Rav. 685 (2012) (detailing
problems inherent in adjudicating First Amendment protections for government workers).
223. See Wolf, supra note 10 (discussing loaning public police to private companies in New
York, Michigan, Chicago, Houston, and Portland).
224. See, e.g., id.; Beau Hodai, Corrections Corporation of America Used in Drug Sweeps of
Public School Students, THE CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY'S PR WATCH (Nov. 27, 2012), http:/
/www.prwatch.org/news/2012/11/11876/corrections-corporation-america-used-drug-sweeps-
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In New York City, the police department has implemented one of these
programs called the "Paid Detail Unit" that essentially leases public
police to private corporations.225 In return for this service, the taxpayers
indemnify the private entity for any liabilities related to an officer's
actions, and the private entity pays the city an hourly fee for service.226
The company gets an armed city police officer with arrest powers, but
incurs no liability, and the public has no way of knowing that those
officers are actually working for the company.227 It begs the question,
what would an officer protecting a business do given a conflict of inter-
est between the bank's wishes and the citizen's rights? 228
Corruption is also a concern that severely affects the public trust
when private entities profit from public services, and is particularly seri-
ous in the criminal justice arena. One example of such corruption
occurred between 2003 and 2008, when two judges in Pennsylvania
accepted kickbacks from the owner of a private juvenile jail facility,
incarcerating hundreds of children who appeared before them without
counsel over a period of several years. 22 9 Both judges were found guilty
and sentenced to significant prison terms, while thousands of convic-
tions were overturned.230 Where oversight is minimal and profit motives
are at play, corruption has the potential to cost not just money, but also
lives.231
While the State Action Doctrine covers those private entities that
are authorized to act by the government, the law governing that doctrine
is not as clear as one might hope.232 Until a uniform approach to the
kinds of private models at play is developed, there remains an ad-hoc
approach that does little to reassure skeptics that private police will
always be subject to state action culpability. In fact, the NYPD "Paid
Detail Unit," described above, offers an illustration of the type of situa-
tion that courts might have difficulty assessing given the complete
entanglement between the public and private sectors: a sworn officer
public-school-students (citing instance of Corrections Corporation of America ("CCA") prison
guards joining local police for drug sweep of local high school).
225. See Wolf, supra note 10.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. (noting the refusal by NYPD spokespersons to answer such a question).
229. Megan Annitto, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 693-94 (2012).
230. Id. at 693 (citations omitted).
231. See Philip Caulfield, "Rot in Hell!" Heartbroken Mom Whose Son Committed Suicide
Confronts Crooked Judge, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 21, 2011, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/rot-hell-heartbroken-mom-son-committed-suicide-confronts-crooked-judge-video-article-
1. 137452 (stating that judges involved in a kick-back scheme resulted in one child committing
suicide after he was sentenced).
232. See generally Turner, supra note 5 (discussing the disparate approaches within the
Supreme Court and lower courts applying differing factors and weighing them unevenly).
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working a shift for the sole benefit of a private entity.2 33
3. EFFICIENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Efficiency tends to be touted as one of the most positive features of
private contracting. When efficiency becomes a central goal of the pri-
vate sector, by measuring it against the existing system, the bar can often
be set quite low. 2 34 The private entity need only do as well as the public-
sector actor and no better. This cost-benefit analysis skews the system's
goals downward, rather than inspiring better approaches to existing
shortfalls within a system.235 Rather than assume the status quo is the
best a city can do, perhaps it might solve some of the issues raised in
policing to suggest other solutions that could benefit the public-not just
in terms of cost, but also in terms of human value and trust.
Proponents suggest that competition is a failsafe measure that
encourages efficiency and accountability, 236 but the obvious concern
arises when there is no competition. Even though it exists in the private
prison industry, the market is small,237 and when a company finds its
profits waning and leaves, the communities it deserts are devastated by
debts, lost jobs, and lost revenue.2 3 8 In small communities that depend
on these markets, companies can use their power and leverage to exact
whatever demands they wish. In the small town of Walnut Grove, Mis-
sissippi, private prison giant GEO Group 23 9 ran a juvenile facility and
pressured lawmakers to lower the age range of those incarcerated, with
the result that inmates from the ages of thirteen to twenty-two were
housed together.24 0 Operating with virtually no oversight, the jail was
233. Cf Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, supra note 5, at 91-101 (noting the distinction
between deputized officers and private officers).
234. See Dolovich, supra note 4, at 132.
235. See id. at 136.
236. See Volokh, supra note 2, at 141-43.
237. See Terry Carter, Prison Break: Budget Crises Drive Reform, but Private Jails Press on,
98 A.B.A. J. 44, 46 (Oct. 2012) (citing $2.9 billion in revenue for the two major private prison
companies, GEO Group and CCA).
238. See John Burnett, Private Prison Promises Leave Texas Town in Trouble, NPR (Mar. 28,
2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/28/134855801/private-prison-promises-leave-
texas-towns-trouble (describing how the GEO Group left Littlefield, Texas, because Idaho stopped
sending prisoners and consequently left the town with $10 million in debt, which resulted in the
town raising property taxes to avoid default).
239. Formerly Wackenhut, GEO Group ("GEO") boasts "101 facilities, approximately 73,000
beds, and 18,000 employees around the globe. GEO's facilities are located in the United States,
United Kingdom, Australia, and South Africa." Career Opportunities, THE GEO GROUP, INC.,
http://www.jobs.net/jobs/geo/en-us/search/the-geo-group/ST7F71R722PDGHSRGH4F/page/2/
(last visited Feb. 2, 2014).
240. See Order Approving Settlement at 1, Depriest v. Epps, No. 3: 10-cv-00663-CWR-FKB
(S.D. Miss. Mar. 26, 2012), ECF No. 75, available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/order.pdf.
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described by the judge, in a Consent Decree following a lawsuit, as hav-
ing allowed
a cesspool of unconstitutional and inhuman acts and conditions to
germinate, the sum of which places the offenders at substantial ongo-
ing risk.
The Court understands completely why the DOJ would conclude
that the sexual misconduct occurring at [the facility], including "bra-
zen" staff sexual misconduct and brutal youth-on-youth rapes, was
"among the worst that we have seen in any facility anywhere in the
nation."241
Whether a municipality can withstand the pressures imposed by private
entities when they become the "only game in town" is something the
public must assess, because once in place, institutional players can be
difficult to eliminate.
Proponents of privatized criminal justice services suggest that con-
tract and legislation drafting are sufficient to address accountability con-
cerns. 2 4 2 However, there is evidence that even when such regulations
exist, they can be ineffective or simply ignored.24 3 For example, private
prisons often tout their audit records as evidence that they fully comply
with all local regulations and contract requirements, but there is little
transparency in most states, so the public has no way of knowing
whether the results are accurate. 2 44 For example, the company that con-
ducts private prison auditing for one large private prison company
charges so much for each day of inspection that accusations have been
leveled against both the auditor and the prison company, suggesting that
such high payments are made in exchange for favorable auditing
reports.2 45 Where policing is concerned, lack of transparency and over-
sight could be dangerous to both public safety and public trust. Even if
legislation and contracting could obviate accountability problems, there
is reason to fear that private companies may draft the contracts and bills
241. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
242. See Volokh, supra note 2, at 151 & n.65; Freeman, supra note 197, at 1288 (arguing for
partnership between public and private entities to enact regulations and regulatory schemes led by
public entities, but noting that partnerships would require compromise from both sides).
243. See Mary K. Reinhart, Arizona Private Prison Oversight Bills Die, THE ARIZONA
REPUBLIC (Feb. 15, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepubliclocal/articles/
2011/02/15/20110215arizona-private-prison-bills.html.
244. See Yana Kunichoff, Expanding Private-Prison Industry Benefits from Weak Oversight
Structure, THE AM. INDEP. (Nov. 2, 2011, 9:49 AM), http://americanindependent.com/202044/
expanding-private-prison-industry-benefits-from-weak-oversight-structure (noting that states have
wide latitude regarding oversight and transparency, including twenty-seven states with mandatory
inspection requirements and eight states with discretionary monitoring authority).
245. Id. (noting that auditor American Correctional Association (ACA) charges $3,000 per day
and that at least two private-prison employees work as auditors for ACA).
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governing their own oversight.246 Or worse, such regulatory require-
ments would not be implemented at all, given the history of oversight in
the private prison industry, where legislators routinely refuse to pass any
such oversight legislation.2 47
1II. POLITICS, ECONOMIC DISTRESS, AND THE LAW
An analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of police priva-
tization cannot be complete without consideration of a powerful addi-
tional factor facilitated by doctrinal developments represented by
Lochner and Citizens United. This Part addresses how these doctrinal
developments sanction the powerful influence private businesses have
over legislative activity and considers the consequences for privatizing
public police forces.
A. Who Makes Policy in Camden?
Whether a community determines that privatizing its public police
force is a net benefit or loss, transparency of the process is vital to mak-
ing a fully informed decision. When the players remain anonymous or
the process is shielded by laws that prevent the public from knowing the
scope of political bargaining, there is a distinct problem that needs
addressing. The legal and political landscapes currently reveal a lack of
will or desire to prioritize the kind of transparency necessary to make
such decisions. That chasm requires a much more robust public engage-
ment to demand full disclosure about campaign financing and to know
who profits from privatization efforts.
The Supreme Court, in reopening the door to laissez-faire constitu-
tionalism, 248 has created an atmosphere wherein corporations effectively
control legislative activity. Through the expanded rights recognized in
Citizens United, corporations can influence elections through direct
campaign contributions that were impermissible in the past.24 9 Along
with employing lobbyists who can pressure politicians to either create
laws or remove barriers, corporations can now directly contribute to
political campaigns, banking on the possibility that politicians who ben-
efit from that spending will have an incentive to do their bidding. In
order to privatize public services, one of the most important elements of
a privatization strategy is to reduce revenue, while at the same time
246. Id. (discussing lobbying by private prison industry to curtail regulations with federal
agencies); see also infra note 264.
247. See Reinhart, supra note 243 (describing how five senate bills in Arizona were defeated
despite numerous management problems).
248. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
249. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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making certain that the politicians tasked with spending are rewarded.
This allows lobbyists to push for lower taxes for corporations and other
affluent citizens, reducing revenue while the corporate treasury supplies
the politicians with enough cash to stay in office. Certainly, there is no
guaranteed victory for the politician; campaigns that have spent vast
amounts of cash have sometimes failed.25 0 But what is also true is that
spending less on a campaign puts politicians at a distinct disadvantage.
Once the economy appears to become unsustainable and public ser-
vices with their attendant benefits become seemingly too expensive, a
private enterprise can then offer its services with the promise that more
competition will reduce costs, as long as unions and bargaining rights
can be limited. Once in place, without collective bargaining, the corpo-
ration offers lower wages to do the same job that was once handled by
the public sector. In Camden, while the police officers have every right
to form a union and begin bargaining anew,251 the city also retains the
power to implement the same reform again in the future with the same
claim of economic necessity.
Without transparency about how political decisions are made, the
public cannot be fully informed to make decisions about privatization
plans; that was certainly the case in Camden. Interestingly, few of the
media accounts about the Camden outsourcing plan considered who
might be backing it, beyond the elected freeholders who cast their votes.
Some residents loudly objected and blamed a local Democratic political
party boss named George Norcross III.252 Norcross is a well-known
political powerbroker in southern New Jersey and serves as chairman of
Cooper University Hospital.253 Norcross takes credit for getting Gover-
nor Corzine to sign an executive order giving Cooper a medical school,
expanding its campus in the city.254 Norcross also takes credit for the
250. E.g., Jeremy Ashkenas et al., The 2012 Money Race: Compare the Candidates, N.Y.
TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (noting
that in his failed presidential campaign for the 2012 presidency, Mitt Romney slightly outspent
Barack Obama, but both candidates spent nearly $1 billion each).
251. Heather Haddon & Ricardo Kaulessar, Baby Steps in Camden: Crime Dips in Camden as
New County Police Force Replaces City Officers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2013, http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SB20001424127887323968704578650171849946106.
252. James Osborne, Puzzling Moves from N.J. Political Boss George E. Norcross III, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Aug. 22, 2011, http://articies.philly.com/2011-08-22/news/29914840 1 camden-
county-political-decision-largest-teachers.
253. See id. (noting that Norcross is often called "the second most powerful figure in New
Jersey politics"); Steve Volk, George Norcross: The Man Who Destroyed Democracy, PHILA.
MAG. (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.phillymag.com/articles/george-norcross-man-destroyed-
democracy/; see also James Osborne & Craig R. McCoy, Powerful Medicine: How George
Norcross Used His Political Muscle to Pump up a Once-Ailing Cooper Hospital, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 25, 2012, http://articles.philly.com/2012-03-25/news/3 1236877_ILnonprofit-
hospitals-hospital-board-chairman-camden-county.
254. Osborne & McCoy, supra note 253.
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idea behind the new police force, which may provide more officers to
secure the hospital.25 5 Once that plan was finalized, Norcross worked
with Governor Chris Christie to open four new charter schools in Cam-
den, an issue important to the governor.2 56 Just a month after the free-
holders voted on the new Metro Police Division, a plan executed by
Governor Christie to merge Cooper's medical school with Rutgers Uni-
versity was given final approval. 25 7 There was nothing illegal about the
way these plans were put into place or the pressure brought to bear on
the elected officials who some claim would be driven from office should
they oppose Norcross, but the saga is an important one to consider, espe-
cially given that Cooper is ranked in the top twenty-five non-profit hos-
pitals in expenditures for lobbying and campaign contributions.2 5 8
Whatever the cause, the consequence of the county-wide outsourcing
plan resulted in more police to patrol the area around Cooper Hospital at
public expense.
B. Who Will Make Policy for Private Police Forces?
When scholars argue that private companies unduly influence poli-
ticians to pass favorable legislation that serves their interests,2 59 critics
point out that there is no clear evidence to prove such a quid pro quo.2 60
In the wake of Citizens United,2 61 answering this question has never
been as important as it is today, given the vast amounts of money flow-
ing into the electoral system through direct and indirect campaign contri-
butions and advertising.262 The level of spending by various PACs and
individuals speaks to a greater need for transparency in order to know
whether there is a smoking gun, and investigations are underway around
the United States to uncover the source of some of that money.263 Aside
255. See Volk, supra note 253 ("[H]e has held numerous meetings with prominent South
Jersey citizens, passionately extolling the virtues of switching to a county-based police force, a
move he believes will bring better services at a reduced cost.").
256. See id.; see also Jason Laday, Gov. Christie Helps Break Ground in Camden on Norcross-
Backed "Renaissance" School, S. JERSEY TIMES, Mar. 5, 2014, http://www.nj.com/camden/
index.ssf/2014/03/gov.christie-helpsjbreak-ground on norcrossschool.html.
257. Heather Haddon & Will James, Rutgers Merger Signed into Law, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22,
2012, http://online.wsj.comlnews/articles/SB10000872396390444270404577605583324769066.
258. See Osborne & McCoy, supra note 253.
259. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DuKE L.J. 437, 543
(2005).
260. Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy, 60
STAN. L. Rav. 1197, 1229-30 (2008).
261. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
262. See 2012 Election Spending Will Reach $6 Billion, Center for Responsive Politics
Predicts, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS (Oct. 31, 2012, 2:33 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/
news/2012/10/2012-election-spending-will-reach-6.html (listing available breakdown of PACs
and individual spending).
263. Current investigations in Montana, California, and New York are attempting to uncover
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from unlimited campaign spending, legislative influence is another
opaque form of direct political action by private entities.
Private entities can participate in writing legislation that directly
benefits their interests. With a section devoted to criminal justice issues,
including private prison and security interests, the conservative Ameri-
can Legislative Exchange Council ("ALEC")21 generates and vets
model legislation for lawmakers to introduce; bills are available to mem-
bers of the organization, which includes lawmakers, business entities,
and private individuals. 265 Lawmakers often deny involvement with
ALEC, but in at least one such instance, the lawmaker accidentally left
ALEC's copyright on the bottom of a bill, later claiming ignorance.2 66
Of the many bills drafted and approved by ALEC, one of the most noto-
rious is Arizona's Senate Bill 1070, a state immigration law that allowed
Arizona police officers to enforce federal immigration laws by requiring
immigration documentation from any subject of a lawful stop. 2 6 7 Intro-
duced by State Senator Russell Pearce, the bill was virtually identical to
one drafted by an ALEC task force on which Pearce sat.268 Pearce
admitted to sending his own version to ALEC for endorsement, but
what has been called "dark money" through 503(c)(4) organizations, which are considered social
welfare non-profit organizations. See Sanjay Talwani, Montana Dark Money Investigations
Widen, KRTV.com (Nov. 15, 2013, 5:17 PM), http://www.krtv.com/news/montana-dark-money-
investigations-widen/; Andy Kroll, California Watchdog: "Koch Brothers Network" Behind $15
Million Dark-Money Donations, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 25, 2013, 8:42 AM), http://www.isidewith.
com/news/article/ever-wondered-how-dark-money-moves-californias-year-long-probe-j; Nicholas
Confessore, Group Linked to Kochs Admits to Campaign Finance Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2013, at A19. Through such organizations, hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent on
local, state, and national elections with no disclosure requirement, and thus, no transparency. This
is the loophole that the Supreme Court did not address in Citizens United when the Court found
that transparency would not be an issue. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371.
264. ALEC is a non-profit organization with nine task forces, 2,000 state legislator members,
and 300 corporate and foundation members. See generally ALEC, http://www.alec.org (last
visited Feb. 4, 2014). Membership for private entities is anywhere from $7,000 to $25,000. See
id.; see also Beau Hodai, Publicopoly Exposed: How ALEC, the Koch Brothers and Their
Corporate Allies Plan to Privatize the Government, IN THESE TIMES, July 11, 2011, http://
inthesetimes.com/article/1 1603/publicopoly-exposed (noting that 1,000 pieces of legislation are
introduced every year, 17% of which become law, and that a two-year membership to lawmakers
costs $100).
265. See Hodai, supra note 264.
266. In 2011, Florida State Representative Chris Dorworth introduced legislation prohibiting
unions from automatically collecting dues and requiring that unions get written permission every
year from each member in order to use any dues for political activity. Id. Similar to other bills
being proposed around the country, a public record request was made. While he denied having any
idea how it got there, the last eleven pages of a stack of eighty-seven pages of draft bills and
emails was stamped, "Copyright, ALEC." Id.
267. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/
legtext/491eg/2R/bills/SB 1070S.pdf.
268. See Beau Hodai, Corporate Con Game: How the Private Prison Industry Helped Shape
Arizona's Anti-Immigrant Law, IN THESE TIMES, Jun. 21, 2010, http://inthesetimes.com/article/
6084/corporate-con-game.
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according to the director of that task force, ALEC does not endorse
bills-it simply drafts them.269 In a hotel room where the task force met
to draft the bill was a representative of Corrections Corporation of
America ("CCA").27 0 No one from the public had access to the drafting,
and only the task force members were present to vote on the language of
the model bill.27 1 Those task force members included state legislators
and corporate representatives.272 According to the president of private
prison company GEO Group, the bill would greatly increase the number
of immigrant detainees in the state. 273 After thirty-six members of the
Arizona Senate co-sponsored it, private prison companies made dona-
tions to thirty of them.274 CCA denied involvement in drafting the legis-
lation and left ALEC in 2010 once the story became public.2 75
That the president of GEO Group has an interest in higher incarcer-
ation rates is not surprising, given the company's business and affilia-
tions; GEO is a member of ALEC and part of the task force that drafted
the bill in Arizona.27 6 The question this example is meant to highlight is
whether society wants its police force owned by a company that may be
drafting legislation that provides a direct benefit to that particular busi-
ness and is doing so in secret. 277 For example, if a private police corpo-
ration were involved in drafting legislation related to the admissibility of
arrest evidence, that would appear to be a conflict of interest. Yet corpo-
rate representatives sit with legislators doing just that, and the public is
not part of that process. These activities are perfectly legal. ALEC is not
required to disclose information about its membership or the source of
its funding, and the public has no right to be present at its private meet-
ings. As the public becomes more aware of ALEC and the close ties
lobbyists cultivate with politicians, demands for greater transparency
269. See id.
270. See Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NPR (Oct. 28,




273. Id. (quoting GEO President during a conference call with investors a month after the
governor signed the bill as saying, "I can only believe the opportunities at the federal level are
going to continue apace as a result of what's happening. Those people coming across the border
and getting caught are going to have to be detained and that for me, at least I think, there's going
to be enhanced opportunities for what we do.").
274. Id. ("Thirty of the [thirty-six] co-sponsors received donations over the next six months,
from prison lobbyists or prison companies-Corrections Corporation of America, Management
and Training Corporation and The Geo Group.").
275. See BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND MASS INCARCERATION, ACLU 15
(2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf.
276. See Hodai, supra note 268.
277. See Sullivan, supra note 270 (noting that State Senator Pearce and the ALEC task force
drafted S.B. 1070 in a Hyatt hotel room).
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may become more pervasive. At that point, the advantages and disad-
vantages of privatizing the police can be more fully debated.
CONCLUSION
Scholars analyzing privatization must take into account the current
political influence available to private industry and the reemergence of
economic liberty jurisprudence. The issues at play with respect to pure
privatization can be present even in the context of outsourcing. There are
arguments to be made in favor of privatization of certain public services
or public-private partnerships, but they can no longer be considered in a
political vacuum. The Lochner Court failed to account for the impact
economic liberty laws had on the working classes at the turn of the
twentieth century, and those who currently fail to account for the ways
in which money and political influence drive privatization and outsourc-
ing at the expense of the public do so at great peril. Analyzing accounta-
bility and economic ramifications fails to capture the nature of
privatization beneficiaries and what motivates the ideology behind
privatization. Drafting contracts to address efficiency and accountability
does little if they are drafted by the very parties to be regulated, and the
shroud of secrecy surrounding legislation erects a great wall between the
public and the law.
It may be trite but it is time, at long last, to follow the money and
recognize that privatization can no longer be considered in an altruistic
frame by simply asking whether such programs better serve the public or
are more cost effective than public services. This Article has sought to
uncover the intersection of current law, political influence, and eco-
nomic distress that allows plans to privatize the police to move forward
and to demonstrate how all of these factors must be considered for the
public to fully confront and address private policing plans in the future.
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